

Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Nations, States, and Nation-States

► INTRODUCTION

The *political geography* of nations and states can explain most of the wars, civil wars, break-ups, and mergers that dominated the international news at the end of the twentieth century. Some 120 wars were fought around the world in 1993, yet they make headlines in the United States only when they boil over into horrific bloodshed—as in Yugoslavia, Somalia, and Rwanda—or when they involve familiar countries such as Iraq, Russia, Israel, and Ireland. Many new countries have emerged as the former Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union fragmented into pieces. Closer to home, French-speaking Québec narrowly defeated referendums on peacefully separating from English-speaking Canada, but the issue just won't go away. East and West Germany went in the opposite direction, dissolving the boundary between them and merging back into one country. Political realignments and so-called small wars (as opposed to wars between superpowers and their smaller allies) became more prevalent after the end of the Cold War. With communism's collapse, rivalry between superpowers no longer kept the lid on simmering ethnic feuds.

To understand political events such as these, you need the proper terms. Before you can learn these terms, however, you must first *unlearn* them. Political geographers use the terms *nation*, *state*, and *nation-state* differently than most Americans do. For instance, Americans use *state* to describe each of the 50 federal subregions of the United States and use *nation* or *nation-state* to refer to the whole United States and to Canada. To a political geographer, however, a **state** refers to an independent, bounded, and internationally recognized territory with full sovereignty over the land and people within it—in other words, a country. In some cases, saying exactly when a political territory becomes fully independent and sovereign can be difficult. For instance, the Republic of China on the island of Taiwan declared itself independent when Mao Zedong's Chinese Communists took over the mainland in 1949, but the mainland People's Republic of China still considers Taiwan to be a break-away part of its own country. Equally ambiguous is determining when the United States went from being a **colony** of Britain to a state: on July 4, 1776, when the

Declaration of Independence was signed, or in 1789 after defeating the British, ratifying the Constitution, and electing the first president.

While a state is a political unit, a **nation** is a cultural unit, a group of people with a common ancestry—regardless of whether the group controls its own country. The root of the word *nation* comes from the Latin *natio*, meaning birth, nation, race, species, or breed. It connotes blood ties between people. A nation is the largest such grouping of people, which distinguishes it from a family, clan, or tribe. Nations see themselves as a cohesive group and as distinct from other groups. Most nations share a common religion, a common language, and accepted social ways of behavior that give it a common culture. These common cultural traits act as a glue to unite people within a nation and as a barrier to divide them from other nations. Not all people in the nation need to have the same language, religion, and biological ancestry as long as they come to believe in the myth of their common ancestry. The Greeks, for instance, hold to the view that they are the direct descendants of peoples of the ancient Greek city-states despite the fact that a massive influx of Slavs beginning in the sixth century so overwhelmed the native Greek population that Greece in the Middle Ages was referred to as *Slavinia* (*Slavland*).

Now we know *what* a nation is, but we also need to consider *when* a cultural group becomes a nation. To become a nation, a cultural group needs to develop a consciousness of being a nation and of foreigners as being different. The group members need to start seeing themselves as Brazilians, Tibetans, or Scots, not just as residents of a particular village and worshippers of a particular religion. Political geographers often trace the origins of national identity to the political philosophies of the U.S. and French revolutions in the late 1700s. Before then, most states were considered personal property of their rulers, but the new thinkers introduced the idea that states should express the will of their people. When ancestral cultural groups develop a *political* consciousness that they should be united and should rule their own lands, they become a nation. Most political geographers hold that even the Chinese, who have had cultural continuity over centuries or millennia, did not evolve a national identity until European political ideals diffused to East Asia during the nineteenth century.

A nation is usually territorially based. We call that territory its **homeland**. It is the motherland or fatherland, the sacred soil. Some nations are lucky enough to rule their own homelands, as the French rule France. Other nations lie within a sovereign state but are officially recognized by that state and are granted varying degrees of **regional autonomy**, such as Québec (in Canada), Scotland (in the United Kingdom), Chechnya (in Russia), and the Navajo Indian Reservation (in the United States). Still others, with names like Zululand, Baluchistan, or Kurdistan, have no official status but are every bit as real to their sons and daughters. The vast majority of the estimated 5,000 nations in the world fall into this category.

There is thus a mismatch between the political geography of states and the cultural geography of nations. Several prototypical cases can be defined. If a nation's homeland corresponds exactly to a state's territory, that nation is said to be a **nation-state** (see Figure 13.1a), which is the political-geographic ideal because it does not give cause to anyone from within or from outside of the country to try to peaceably or forcefully alter the state's boundaries. However, nation-states are the exception rather than the rule. A survey of territories generally considered to be full-fledged states in 1971 found that only 9 percent of them could be considered nation-states. Some examples include Japan, Sweden, Portugal, and Costa Rica.




Figure 13.1 Examples of the political geography of nations and states.

If the state and national boundaries are not conterminous (i.e., they do not match), the potential for conflict exists. A basic distinction can be drawn between a multinational state and a multistate nation. A *multination* state occurs when several distinct nations are found together in the same political state as, for example, in Canada or South Africa. While this is not always a recipe for unrest (e.g., the multinational Swiss), more often than not it leads to **ethnonationalism**, which is a strong feeling of belonging to a minority nation that is contained within a state dominated by a more powerful nation (see Figure 13.1b). In its weak form, ethnonationalism can lead to a desire for regional autonomy to maintain one's native language and traditions (e.g., Wales); in its strong form, it can lead to **separatism**, the desire to break away and form one's own nation-state (e.g., Québec in Canada or Tibet in China) or outright **secession** (e.g., Lithuania, which left the Soviet Union in 1991, or the Slovaks, who divorced the Czechs in 1993). Many separatist groups will resort to violent means to achieve their desired ends, and most states feel justified in using force to suppress these revolts and keep their territory intact. In fact, of the estimated 122 wars in 1993, 97 could be categorized as a state vs. a minority nation within its borders.¹

A *multistate nation*, on the other hand, exists when a national homeland overlaps into more than one state. In this case, one state encompasses the majority of the nation, and "outliers" exist in neighboring states (see Figure 13.1c). A multistate nation can give rise to **irredentism**, which occurs if a nation's homeland spills over into another state and the people on the "wrong side" of the boundary wish to join their territory with the rest of their homeland. Often, a sign of irredentism at work is when one of the nations refers to its homeland as "Greater _____," as in Greater Somalia or Greater Germany, which implies that the nation believes it has been constrained into only a portion of its true homeland. This situation existed for Germany prior to World War II, when many ethnic Germans lived in Czechoslovakia and Poland, giving Hitler an excuse to expand. The term *irredentism* originates from the Italian expression *Italia irredenta*, or "unredeemed Italy." Until the 1860s, the Italian peninsula was divided among a handful of kingdoms, duchies, republics, and papal states. In 1871, when the state of Italy was finally unified, Italian nationalists began referring to Tirol, a key Italian-speaking region still in Austro-Hungarian hands, as *Italia irredenta*.

The French Canadian nation is a classic example of ethnonationalism that has led to a separatist movement. As with many such cases, one needs to venture across centuries and oceans to trace the roots of the current situation. In 1608, the French established a colony on the banks of the St. Lawrence River where the City of Québec now lies, two years before the first British colony in Newfoundland. Both the French and the British were after land, glory, aboriginal converts to their brand of Christianity, a shipping route to the Orient, and the furs of animals found in the cold northern forests. After 150 years of struggle between the two empires, France ceded virtually all of its North American claims to the British in 1763. Eleven years later, the British, in the face of unrest among the French population of 70,000 and not wanting to be diverted from the task of holding on to its more lucrative colonies to the south, proclaimed the Québec Act, guaranteeing French rights to speak the French language, practice Catholicism, and abide by the French legal system. Canadian

¹Nietschmann, Bernard. 1994. The Fourth World: Nations Versus States, pp. 225-242 in *Reordering the World: Geopolitical Perspectives on the 21st Century*, George J. Demko and William B. Wood (eds.). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

provinces united in 1867 into the British-ruled Dominion of Canada, and its young people, including French speakers, fought alongside other British soldiers in various colonial wars from South Africa to India. Canada was granted full legislative authority over domestic and external affairs in 1931 and acquired its own constitution and charter of rights (with full independence from the United Kingdom) in 1982. Today, the French-speaking population, living disproportionately in rural villages and educated in church-run schools, has grown to 6.6 million of Canada's 28 million.

The French Canadian nation makes up the majority in Québec, and a substantial minority in the provinces of New Brunswick and Newfoundland (Figure 13.1b). Because French speakers are such a large minority, the Canadian government conducts all public business in both French and English. The Québec provincial government, on the other hand, passed laws requiring that children of immigrants attend French-language schools and that Québec provincial affairs be conducted in French only. As a result, many Canadian corporations and English speakers moved to other provinces. French nationalism reached new heights in the 1960s and 1970s with the rise of an extremist group, the *Front Libération de Québec*, and a strongly nationalist political party in 1976. However, separatist referendums for Québec sovereignty failed in 1977 and 1995 because only a slight majority of French speakers supported it (Figure 13.2) while the vast majority of English speakers opposed it (Figure 13.3). In contrast to many other ethnonational situations around the world, English- and French-speaking Canadians have eschewed violence and pursued territorial goals through dialogue.

Not all international conflicts lend themselves to a clear explanation using the concepts of nations and states and homelands. The ongoing crisis in Israel between the Hebrew-speaking Jews and the Arabic-speaking, Islamic Palestinians is a case in point. In this complex situation, both nations claim the same territory as their homeland. The Jewish historical claim is based on ancient occupation before the



Figure 13.2 Québec pro-secession march in the last days before the referendum in October, 1995. Supporters of a “*Oui*” (“Yes”) vote to secede from Canada carried Québec flags and brandished nonviolent symbols such as flowers and peace signs.



Figure 13.3 At a rally against Québec separatism in Montreal, the largest city in Québec, supporters of a “Non” vote pleaded to the “Oui” voters in French: “My Québécois friends—I am convinced that your hopes and dreams can become reality in a united Canada. No, no, no. Toronto.”

Jews were forcibly expelled from Palestine in two **diasporas** (dispersals of a population), first by the Babylonians in the seventh century B.C. and then by the Romans in the first century A.D. For the next two millennia, the region was home to Arab people who converted to Islam in the seventh century A.D.

Jews began returning to Palestine and buying up land in the 1920s when the region came under British control. From the 1920s to 1940s, the British, the League of Nations, and the United Nations tried unsuccessfully to broker partition plans for dividing the territory. After the first of many wars, Israel became a state in 1948. The Palestinian people—who may or may not have seen themselves as a distinct nation at that time, but who most certainly do today—found themselves divided between those within the new state’s boundaries and almost a million **refugees** who had fled Israel proper to neighboring states on the eve of war. Today, the Palestinians have won a limited form of regional autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza Strip territories (Figure 13.4), two of the areas where the refugees settled but were not the Palestinians’ original homelands. Any lasting peace agreement must overcome the resistance of hard-liners on both sides, the need of both states for a sustainable water supply, and the particularly thorny issue of Jerusalem, which both religions regard as a holy site (Figure 13.5).

Now you can begin to see the terminological chaos that clouds our understanding of current events. The United States of America is actually not a union of independent



Figure 13.4 Israel and the Occupied Territories.

states but perhaps is described better as the United **Provinces** of America. If the United Nations were really an organization of nations, it would have more than 5,000 members instead of the approximately 200 states that currently have seats in it. The term *international* in fact refers to *interstate*, while Americans' use of *interstate* (as



Figure 13.5 In Jerusalem, Jews pray at the Western (or “Wailing”) Wall that is the last surviving remnant of the Temple of Solomon. Just above it can be seen the Dome of the Rock mosque, the oldest existing Islamic structure in the world, built in the seventh century on the spot from which Muhammed is believed to have ascended to heaven.

in interstate highways) is really *intrastate*. **Nationalism** has come to mean loyalty to the state, when it is often quite the opposite—loyalty to one’s nation. Of course, it is understandable that the dominant nations would confuse nationalism and **patriotism** (loyalty to the state) because for them, the nation and state are the same.

An example of proper usage of *nation* is in the *Pledge of Allegiance* to the U.S. flag. The expression “One nation under god” refers properly, if wishfully, to *a group of people with a common culture and ideals* (nation). Despite their lack of blood ties, most (but not all) Americans do share a common historical experience in that they or their ancestors came to the United States in search of opportunity or freedom. However, the lack of blood ties to other Americans makes it difficult for us to fathom what drove Serbs, Croats, Bosnian Muslims, and Kosovar Albanians to massacre each other in the former state of Yugoslavia—the subject of Activity 1—instead of coexisting in a “melting pot” or “cultural stew” as Americans do. Similarly, it could be leading Americans to underestimate the difficulty of holding Iraq together after Saddam Hussein’s forced overthrow—the subject of Activity 2.

▶ CASE STUDY

BREAKING UP IS HARD TO DO

GOAL

To explain what can happen when **nations** and **states** don't coincide geographically. Using news articles, you will analyze the nations and states involved in either the breakup of Yugoslavia or the complex situation in Iraq.

LEARNING OUTCOMES

After completing the chapter, you will be able to:

- Distinguish between the concepts of a nation and a state.
- Distinguish between the concepts of ethnonationalism and irredentism.
- Recognize whether a country is a nation-state and, if not, why not.
- Critically analyze news stories on ethnic conflicts around the world.
- Interpret current events in the former Yugoslavia or Iraq.

SPECIAL MATERIALS NEEDED

None

BACKGROUND

The crisis in the former Yugoslavia dominated international news during the 1990s. Iraq has done the same for the beginning of the new millennium. This chapter will help you understand these distant conflicts.

War in Yugoslavia has killed about one-quarter of a million people, forced several million more to leave their homes and become refugees, and decimated a once-beautiful country. The discovery of modern-day genocide just a few hundred kilometers from the borders of the European Union was truly shocking to many Europeans. Organized rape was used not only as an act of hatred and a means to demoralize the enemy but also as a way to dilute the bloodlines that form the very core of a nation's existence. A peace plan forged in 1995 by the Clinton administration was grudgingly accepted by the three major combatants in Bosnia—the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims—only to see the entire bloody scenario repeat itself in 1999 in Kosovo. An international coalition led by the United States intervened militarily to stop the Serbs from further ethnic cleansing of Kosovo. As of 2003, international peacekeepers, including U.S. and Canadian troops, still occupied Bosnia and Kosovo to keep the lid on the conflict and enforce the peace accord.

Yugoslavia lies in southeastern Europe in an area that political geographers describe as a **shatterbelt**—a region

in which state boundaries have been drawn and redrawn many different times over the years, largely as a result of being caught between powerful forces. The nations in the shatterbelt of southeastern Europe have been ruled by one empire after another, with occasional periods of independence. Shatterbelts tend to form in areas with two geographical characteristics. First, the areas tend to be topographically fractured (very mountainous), which prevents the emergence of a major power that might have expelled the many small independent nations and expelled outside invaders. Second, shatterbelts tend to be at a crossroads of trade and migration, which opens them up to outside powers and deposits new groups of people in their midst. Shatterbelts can have very complex geographies of nations and states. In the words of Vuk Draskovic, a leading Yugoslavian dissident, “The ethnic map of prewar Bosnia, and indeed prewar Yugoslavia, was like a jaguar’s skin. The people were inseparably mixed. No magician could make ethnic borders on such a jaguar’s skin.”² Other shatterbelts are in the Caucasus and Southeast Asia.

Unlike Yugoslavia, Iraq is not in a shatterbelt. In fact, Iraq’s Tigris and Euphrates river plains were the heartland of several ancient empires. Like Yugoslavia, however, some of its past, present, and future troubles stem from the way its political boundaries cut across nations. Similar to Yugoslavia, the state of Iraq and its boundaries were created by an outside power—in this case, the British—in the first half of the twentieth century. Iraq’s crisis is less about ethnic divisions than is Yugoslavia’s and more about global geopolitics, religion, terrorism, and oil. The ethnic makeup of Iraq, however, with Sunni Moslems, Shia Moslems, and Kurds, greatly complicates the situation.

Activities 1 and 2 of this chapter deal with the situations in Yugoslavia and Iraq, respectively. You will read a variety of news stories, analyses, and government reports about the ancient and modern histories of Yugoslavia and Iraq. Ethnic maps will help you analyze the current situations. Both case studies provide multimedia sources of information, each of which has only part of the story, instead of a single comprehensive summary. You will use these sources to answer fill-in-the-blank questions about the background to the crises, the conflagrations of violence, and the reasons it is so difficult to disentangle the nations within a state from each other cleanly. You will learn the reasons that, once a state is in place, breaking it up is indeed hard to do.

The U.S. Department of State and the CIA both recruit geographers (among others) to write intelligence reports, analyze foreign situations, study boundary disputes, make

²Quoted in Roger Cohen, “The Tearing Apart of Yugoslavia: Place by Place, Family by Family,” *New York Times* (May 9, 1993), p. 4.

► **CASE STUDY** (*continued*)

maps, and interpret satellite images and aerial photographs. The State Department has an official Office of the Geographer and Global Issues (GGI) in the Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Some of the skills you will use in these activities are those that the agencies value highly in geographers, namely the abilities to read maps, apply terms and definitions to messy situations, and synthesize the historical, cultural, economic, demographic, and physical forces that act on a region.

A recent survey by the National Geographic Society found that only one in seven Americans age 18 to 24, the prime age for military service, could locate Iraq on a world map. Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centers and the Pentagon and with the recent war with Iraq, the importance of Activity 2 on Iraq is painfully obvious. But why should you, a college student far from the fighting, personally care about Yugoslavia? First, part of the Dayton Peace Accords was the commitment of 16,000 U.S. troops to the peacekeeping force. Second, the United States has a population of minorities: Native American, Polish American, Hispanic American, African-American, Jewish American, Asian American, and so on. Although you may not be of Slavic or Muslim ancestry, the concepts you learn here will help you understand what is going on in other areas of the world to which you could have personal attachments. Nation-state conflicts continue to flare up between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland (see Chapter 12); in Punjab, Kashmir, and Sri Lanka on the Indian subcontinent; in East Timor in Indonesia; in Tibet (controlled by China); in Israel and Palestine; in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Chechnya in the former Soviet Caucasus; and between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda, Burundi, and Congo. Third, ethnonational issues exist in North America. As recently as the 1970s, Native Americans clashed with the U.S. government and the two still have conflicts over water rights, fishing, waste

dumping, gambling, and burial sites. Canada is officially a bilingual state because of French-speaking descendants in Québec, many of whom still want to secede from Canada. In southern Mexico, a rebellion by indigenous (Indian) peoples in Chiapas is ongoing; they believe the government does not represent their interests in struggles for land and improvements to their living conditions. Therefore, as a voter, as a taxpayer, as a friend or relative of a U.S. or Canadian soldier or peacekeeper, as a descendant of immigrants, or as a Native American or Québécois, you need to be informed about these issues.

Note: We realize that, by the time you do this exercise, the situations in Iraq and the former Yugoslavia could have changed drastically or faded from view. In *political geography, change is unavoidable*. We have tried to make this chapter as relevant and up-to-date as possible at the time of publication. Students interested in keeping up with the current situation should consult our sources: *The Christian Science Monitor*, *The New York Times*, CNN.com, the United Nations, and the U.S. Department of State, or others including *Time*, *Newsweek*, *The Economist*, and *U.S. News and World Report*, or in-depth journals such as *Foreign Affairs*, *The Atlantic Monthly*, *Current History*, *International Affairs*, *Journal of Peace Research*, *Ethnic Racial Studies*, and the *American Journal of International Law*. In addition, you can find current updates on the Internet (see Web References at the end of the chapter).

If any major change occurs to drastically alter this situation, your instructor will notify you that a revised version of these questions has been posted on the *Human Geography in Action* student Web site (www.wiley.com/college/kuby).

Name: _____

Instructor: _____

Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Nations, States, and Nation-States

► ACTIVITY 1: THE RISE OF NATIONALISM AND THE FALL OF YUGOSLAVIA


Activity 1 requires you to read six selections about the former Yugoslavia and then answer questions about them. The first article (Goodrich, 1993) is from *The Christian Science Monitor*. It is one of several articles we have selected from the *Monitor* because of its world-famous coverage of international affairs—not because of its religious affiliation. The Goodrich article provides a 1,500-year historical overview that is not usually available in newspapers. We have added a few key points to this article [in square brackets], and some useful maps (Figures 13.6–13.8).

The second reading consists of excerpts from a United Nations research article by Ali Karaosmanoglu (1993) that offers a concise summary of how and why the former Yugoslavia fell apart. It highlights the most important fact about the political geography of the area: that the former Yugoslavia was a multinational state, but breaking it into its individual republics (i.e., provinces) did not solve the problem because both Bosnia and Croatia were also each a mix of nations.

In the third article, photojournalist Lee Malis of *The Christian Science Monitor* tells the harrowing tale of one young Muslim woman's nightmare at the hands of the Bosnian Serbs. We warn you of the graphic nature of this short feature article, you could find it disturbing. It should be emphasized that the Serbs were not the only nation to engage in such war crimes.

Why not carve Bosnia up into three states, and let the Serbian part of Bosnia join with Serbia and the Croatian part of Bosnia join with Croatia? Why does the rest of the world care about keeping Bosnia in one piece? This is the subject of the fourth reading, a short analysis by Laura Kay Rozen from *The Christian Science Monitor* in September 1996, at the time of the first-ever Bosnian elections. Five key points summarize why keeping Bosnia whole was important to the foreign policies of other countries. Note that neither we (the textbook authors) nor the article author herself necessarily espouse all of these arguments. In fact, one of the points regarding a fear of Islamic terrorism from a Muslim-dominated Bosnian state is an example of prejudicial thinking. However, all five arguments frequently were heard on talk shows and seen on op-ed pages of the time.

The final reading consists of excerpts from two U.S. Department of State reports on the Kosovo (pronounced Koh-SOH-vah) crisis. The stated purpose of these reports was to document the extent of ethnic cleansing by the Serbs against the Albanians in Kosovo. Aerial photography and other forms of evidence accompanied these reports, which were delivered to the Executive Branch of the U.S. government and Congress, U.S. allies, and the international community. They were important documents in the decisions to use U.S. military power to stop the ethnic cleansing in Kosovo and to justify the deployment of U.S. troops as peacekeepers. The reports were also made available to the media and the public over the Internet. In reading these excerpts, you should think about some of the geopolitical issues that could explain why the United States chose to intervene in this particular crisis but not in



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others. The Serbs have historically been allies with the Russians, who are also Slavs who follow an Eastern Orthodox form of Christianity. Other issues to consider are the U.S.'s historic alliance with Western Europeans, the importance of not appearing to be anti-Islamic, and the power of media images of mass graves, burning houses, and refugees.

It would take many newspaper articles to fill you in on all that happened in the aftermaths of the Bosnia and Kosovo crises. We wrap it up for you with a short summary and map that updates you to early 2003.

► **ACTIVITY 1 READINGS**

- Goodrich, Lawrence J. 1993. Old Animosities, Exploited Today, Underlie Complex Balkans Puzzle. *The Christian Science Monitor* (Oct. 13, 1993):1–2.
- Karaosmanoglu, Ali L. 1993. *Crisis in the Balkans*. United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Research Paper no. 22, UNIDIR/93/37. New York: United Nations.
- Malis, Lee. 1993. Bosnia: The Flight from Ethnic Cleansing. *The Christian Science Monitor* (Feb. 7, 1993):9–11.
- Rozen, Laura Kay. 1996. Keeping Bosnia Whole: Why the World Cares? *The Christian Science Monitor* (Sept. 19, 1996):5.
- U.S. Department of State. 1999. *Erasing History: Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo*. www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/rpt_9905_ethnic_ksvo_toc.html. (May 1999).
- U.S. Department of State. 1999. *Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo: An Accounting*. www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/kosovoii/homepage.html. (Dec. 1999).

► **QUESTIONS**

(Note: Answers to questions marked by * cannot be obtained directly in the readings. You'll need to think critically about the readings and apply concepts properly to figure them out.)

A. History of Hatred

Refer to articles by Goodrich and Karaosmanoglu and Figures 13.6 and 13.9.

1.1. What cultural trait, language or religion, divides the Serbs and Croats?


1.2. Name the religion of the Serbs _____ and of the Croats. _____

1.3. What historical development is responsible for this religious divide between Serbs and Croats? _____

1.4. How did Muslims come to this region of Europe?

1.5. In what century did the Muslims defeat Serbia in the battle of Kosovo?

1.6. What other outside empire next dominated the northern parts of the region in the several centuries prior to World War I? _____



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1.7. A country called Yugoslavia (Land of the Southern Slavs) first came into being after World War I. Which of its member nations dominated Yugoslavia at that time?

1.8. What happened during World War II that further increased Serb-Croat hatred and added to the Serb sense of victimhood?

B. The Prebreakup Situation

Refer to articles by Goodrich and Karaosmanoğlu, Figures 13.7 and 13.8, and Table 13.1.

After World War II, Yugoslavia adopted a federal system of government. The country was divided into six “republics,” similar to the 50 U.S. states and 13 Canadian provinces, but with one important difference. In Yugoslavia, the government tried to define the republics along ethnonational lines.

1.9. Which republic was most ethnically uniform?*

1.10. Which republic was least ethnically uniform?*

1.11. Prior to its breakup, was Yugoslavia a nation-state, a multistate nation, or a multination state?*

1.12. The prewar state of Yugoslavia referred to its component regions as “republics.” Would a political geographer have called them states, nations, or provinces?*

1.13. From World War II until its breakup, Yugoslavia had what kind of government, communist, capitalist, or monarchy? *


C. The Breakup

Refer to article by Karaosmanoğlu, Figures 13.7 and 13.8, and Table 13.1.

From 1991 to 1993, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia all claimed independent status. In fact, the breakup of Yugoslavia consisted of three wars, not one.

1.14. Did Yugoslavia break up because of ethnonationalism or irredentism?*

1.15. The first war, which lasted only ten days, was between Slovenia and the Yugoslavian government after Slovenia declared its independence in the spring of 1991. Would the declaration of independence by Slovenia be described as an act of irredentism or secession?*



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1.16. Why didn't the Serb-dominated government of Yugoslavia put up more of a fight to keep Slovenia from breaking away?^o

1.17. After Slovenia became independent, could it have been characterized as a nation-state (see Figure 13.8)?^o _____

1.18. The second war also started in the spring of 1991, but in Croatia. The two warring nations were _____ and _____.

D. Bosnia

Use article by Rozen, Table 13.1, and Figures 13.7, 13.8, and 13.12.

To answer the next set of questions, you need to adjust your mental map. After breaking up, the former Yugoslavia consisted of five states, not one. In addition to Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia, the remaining two republics, Serbia and Montenegro, stayed together under the name of Yugoslavia. They were sometimes referred to as the "rump Yugoslavia" to distinguish it from the former, larger Yugoslavia. The third war within the former Yugoslavia began in Bosnia in the spring of 1992.

1.19. Which was the dominant nation within Bosnia in terms of population?


1.20. Name the second and third most populous nations within Bosnia's borders.

1.21. Which, if any, of these two minority nations in Bosnia were irredenta of other states?^o _____

1.22. After Bosnia established its independence, would it have been best described as a state, a nation, or a nation-state?^o _____

1.23. Why would the breakup of Bosnia worsen the refugee problem?

1.24. What message would the permanent breakup of Bosnia into two or three separate states send to other ethnic groups in the Balkans and around the world?



1.25. Why wouldn't the Serb-dominated part of Bosnia, which the Bosnian Serbs call *Republika Srpska*, be a viable independent state?

E. Kosovo and Ethnic Cleansing (1999)

Refer to articles by U.S. State Department, Karaosmanoğlu, and Goodrich, Figures 13.7 and 13.8, Table 13.1, and the author's update.

1.26. In what state is Kosovo? _____


1.27. What two nations cohabit Kosovo? _____ and _____

1.28. What nation is the majority in Kosovo? _____

1.29. What state's citizens would likely have irredentist feelings towards Kosovo?°

1.30. What is the aim of "ethnic cleansing"?

1.31. Name five methods of ethnic cleansing.



E. All's Not Quiet on the Balkan Front

Refer to Update by authors and Figure 13.8.

1.32. Is there still a state called Yugoslavia? _____

If not, what is it called now? _____

1.33. Aside from the smoldering conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo, what other political geographic issues remain that might break up an existing state and create a new state in the region?

► ACTIVITY 1 READINGS

► *THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR*

October 13, 1993

Old Animosities, Exploited Today, Underlie Complex Balkans Puzzle³


by Lawrence J. Goodrich, staff writer of *The Christian Science Monitor*. Reprinted by permission.

Boston—As the likelihood grows that American forces will be directly involved in trying to restore the peace in the former Yugoslavia, many Americans are asking how the slaughter there began.

Unfortunately, what is happening today in the Balkans is nothing new. It is the continuation of the ethnic and religious hatreds that have swept the region for centuries, made worse by radical nationalists' cynical exploitation of these animosities.

The ethnic mixture of the Balkans began to form about the 5th century A.D. Vast tribal migrations swept across Europe: Germanic tribes came west, followed by Slavs to their east. In succeeding centuries Magyars (Hungarians), Mongols, Tatars, and Bulgars ranged over the Balkans. Between Western and Eastern Europe, a great gulf developed. Rome had fallen, but the Roman Empire in the East, with its capital at Constantinople (Byzantium), lasted another 1,000 years. The Roman church without a state and the Byzantine church subservient to the emperor split over long-standing political and theological disputes. This chasm went right through the Balkans: Hungarians, Slovenes, and Croats were Roman Catholic, while Romanians, Bulgarians, Greeks, and Serbs were Eastern Orthodox [see Figure 13.6a].

³Adapted by the authors.



All across Europe nation-states began to form around the most powerful tribes. But in the 14th and 15th centuries, a series of catastrophes struck the Balkans. First the Ottoman Turks defeated Serbia at the battle of Kosovo in 1389. Constantinople (now Istanbul) fell in 1453. [The Ottoman Turks introduced the Muslim (i.e., Islamic) religion into the region.] By 1529 the Turks had fought their way to the gates of Vienna, which they besieged again in 1683 [see Figure 13.6b]. All political, cultural, and economic evolution in those parts of the Balkans under Turkish rule stopped under the oppression of the Turkish sultan.

For the next 400 years, the history of the Balkans was a history of rivalry among the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian empires. Croats, Slovenes, and Transylvanian Romanians lived under the influence of Vienna and Budapest [see Figure 13.6c]. Romanians, Bulgarians, Macedonians, Serbs, and some Albanians clung tenaciously to their Eastern Orthodox faith, which became entwined with their national aspirations. Most Albanians and some Slavs, however, converted to Islam.

The Balkan peasantry was kept impoverished as agricultural riches were shipped off to feed the Ottoman Empire. The Turks played off tribes, clans, and families against each other, poisoning the political culture.

Christianity was barely tolerated.

None of the subsequent development of Western and Central Europe—the growth of guilds and the middle class, the decline of feudalism, the Reformation and the Counterreformation, the Renaissance and the Enlightenment—touched the Balkans.

By the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was in serious decline. Most of the Balkan ethnic groups began to agitate for independence and their own states. But their villages were often scattered among each other.

Little by little each group threw off Turkish rule. Russia felt a special calling to help its Orthodox Slav brethren, the Serbs and Bulgarians, and provided political or military support.

But the rule of the Balkans is: Everything for my ethnic group and nothing for yours. The group on top now governs at the expense of the others; the groups out of power wreak vengeance when the power balance shifts. People see themselves as Serbs, Croatians, or Albanians first and as individuals second.

This attitude is preserved by the region's economic backwardness and low educational levels. It is especially true in rural areas. While cities may be ethnically mixed, villages usually are ethnically pure, or nearly so.

[In 1908, Austria-Hungary directly annexed Bosnia, inciting the Serbs to seek the aid of Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Greece in seizing the last Ottoman-ruled lands in Europe. In the ensuing Balkan Wars of 1912–1913, Serbia obtained northern and central Macedonia, but Austria compelled it to yield Albanian lands that would have given Austria access to the sea. Serb animosity against Austria-Hungary reached a climax on June 28, 1914, when the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo by a Bosnian Serb, Gavrilo Princip—the spark that lit the powder keg of World War I.⁴]

After the Turkish and Austrian Empires collapsed at the end of World War I, the victorious Allies carved up the remains into a series of new, artificial Balkan states. The southern Slav groups were lumped together in what officially was christened

⁴U.S. Department of State, Bureau of European Affairs. 1999. *Background Notes: Serbia and Montenegro*: www.state.gov/www/background_notes/serbia_9908_bgn.html. (August 1999).



a. The Roman Empire adopted Christianity in the fourth century, and split administration between a western half centered on Rome, and an eastern half whose capital was Constantinople (now Istanbul, Turkey). The western half became predominantly Catholic, the eastern half predominantly Orthodox. This divide still runs through the former Yugoslavia: Slovenes and Croats are mostly Catholic, while Serbs, Macedonians, and Montenegrins are mostly Orthodox.



b. Islam originated in Mecca in current-day Saudi Arabia, but soon spread to include what is now Turkey. Centuries later, the Ottoman Empire arose in Turkey and spread Islam well into the Balkans and Europe. Current-day Bosnian Muslims are mostly Slavs who converted to Islam during the long reign of the Ottomans.



c. The outside power that controlled most of the Balkans on the eve of World War I was the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In fact, World War I was triggered when a Bosnian Serb, irate over the latest chapter of outside domination, assassinated the Austro-Hungarian Archduke Ferdinand in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914.

Figure 13.6 Three major empires that divided the Slavic-speaking peoples in the Balkans.

Yugoslavia [literally “land of the southern Slavs”], in 1918. Serbia was the dominant partner, which led to constant friction with the Croats. The new country never had a chance. Nazi Germany invaded in 1941 and set up a fascist Croatian puppet state. [The Croatian] Ustashe troops committed terrible atrocities against Bosnian and

Croatian Serbs [murdering approximately 350,000 Serbs]. Serbian nationalist guerrillas, the Chetniks, retaliated in kind.

Communist partisans under Josip Broz Tito, armed by the Allies, fought the Germans to a standstill, broke with the Chetniks, and took power at the end of the war. [Post-World War II Yugoslavia had the same external boundaries as before, but internally it was divided into six republics: Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Montenegro (Figure 13.7ab). There was some attempt to define these republics along ethnonational lines, but of the six, only Slovenia was even close to being ethnically pure; see Table 13.1 and Figure 13.8.] Communist rule under Marshal Tito kept a tight lid on ethnic feuding, but it continued to smolder. [Under communist rule, Serbia was transformed from an agrarian to an industrial




Figure 13.7 (a) Pre-breakup Yugoslavia; (b) Post-breakup Yugoslavia.




Figure 13.8 Prewar ethnic distribution in the former Yugoslavia.

TABLE 13.1 Percentages of Prewar Ethnic Populations, by Republic or Autonomous Region

	Albanians	Croats	Muslims	Serbs	Slovenes	Others
Bosnia		18	40	33		9
Croatia		75	12			13
Kosovo	90%			10		
Macedonia	23			2		67 Macedonians 8 Others
Montenegro	7	1	15	9		68 Montenegrins
Serbia	20	2		65		13
Slovenia		3		2	90	5
Vojvodina				56		21 Hungarians 23 Others
Former Yugoslavia (all republics)	14	20	9	36	8	13

Sources: James Gow, "Deconstructing Yugoslavia," *Survival* 33:293 (1991); *Encyclopedia Britannica*; *CIA Factbook*; and PC-Globe software (1989).

society.] When Tito died in 1980, he left in place a collective presidency of Yugoslavia that rotated among the six republics.

But without Tito's personal magnetism and willingness to use force, the system soon began to break down. After communism collapsed in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the Yugoslav federation began to dissolve as Croats and Slovenes demanded independence, partly in pursuit of historic aspirations but also in fear of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic's repression of the Albanian minority in Kosovo. Mr. Milosevic and Croatian President Franjo Tudjman made things worse by their inflammatory rhetoric and their policies of grabbing land from neighboring republics, to create a greater Serbia and a greater Croatia, and to expel other groups.

The region remains a tinder box: Greeks are nervous about the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia; Montenegrins, still united with Serbia in rump Yugoslavia, are growing restless; and serious tensions persist between Hungarians and Romanians.

The most dangerous area is Kosovo province in Serbia. An historical Serbian heartland, it is now inhabited mostly by ethnic Albanians, who have seen their rights suppressed by the Milosevic government. Almost half the Albanians in the world live in Serbia; should the Serbs start an ethnic-cleansing campaign, it is doubtful Albania could stand by. Such a conflict could ignite tensions between Greece, which likely would side with the Orthodox Serbs, and Turkey, which would support the Muslim Slavs and mostly Muslim Albanians.

The question now is whether the US can provide the leadership that will take the Balkans in the direction of peace or whether the region will sink deeper into disaster.

► THE UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR DISARMAMENT RESEARCH

UNIDIR/93/37, Research Paper No. 22, 1993. Reprinted by permission.

Excerpted from "Crisis in the Balkans"

by Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu

The 19th and 20th centuries have undoubtedly left scars that are difficult to cure. But the immediate cause of the present Yugoslav crisis is neither external power

intervention nor traditional ethnic animosities. The latter could well be prevented from escalating to a bloody conflict situation if moderate policies were adopted by the conflicting regional entities. First of all, Serbia's, and its extreme nationalist leader Milosevic's, ambition to create a "Greater Serbia" constitute the major cause of the crisis.⁵ To some extent, the crisis is also the product of the Croatian and Bosnian policies of independence which failed to show sufficient consideration for the large Serbian communities in both countries.

Yugoslavia's nations had "very different and often mutually exclusive needs and aspirations." For the Serbs [who were the dominant power], Yugoslavia's future depended on further and tighter centralization. The non-Serb majorities, on the contrary, were in favor of creating their own sovereign states, or at least a confederation of sovereign states. . . .

A series of events in 1990–91 contributed to the deterioration of the crisis. In April 1990, the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) and the Democratic United Opposition of Slovenia (DEMOS) came to power as a result of multi-party elections. Both political parties were centre-right and pro-independence. During the election campaign, the HDZ advocated a "Greater Croatia" that would annex Croat-populated regions of Bosnia while condemning "greater Serbian hegemony" [i.e., dominance]. This created considerable concern among the Serbian population living in the border areas of Croatia. The Serbian perception of this threat was reinforced, on the one hand, by the increasingly secessionist stance of Croatia, and on the other, by the expulsion of Serbs from government positions. Moreover, the Croatian authorities threatened the Serbs by saying they would take measures to weaken Serbian economic position in the republic. These moves of the Croatian government led to growing Serbian fears, and, eventually, to insurrections and armed clashes. . . .

In February, [Serbian President] Milosevic and [Croatian President] Tudjman agreed on Serbian and Croatian annexations in Bosnia. . . . [A Bosnian referendum on independence] was held in March 1992 without Serbian participation. The Muslims and Croats voted in favor of a "sovereign and independent Bosnia and Herzegovina" while the Serbs were erecting barricades around Sarajevo.

So far there have been three wars in the Yugoslav succession. The first took place in Slovenia in the Spring of 1991 and lasted for 10 days. The Serbian minority in Slovenia is only 2.4% of the population and is not implicated in the Serbian design of creating a "Greater Serbia." The conflict remained local without regional or international implications. The second war [between Croats and Serbs from Croatia and Serbia] started in Croatia in the spring of 1991. The hostilities were resumed again in February 1993 while the UN and EC representatives were working on a peace plan. The third began in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the spring of 1992 and is still being waged.

The last two conflicts had a significant similarity. One of their common features was the application by the Serbs of policies of "ethnic cleansing." This involved changing the demographic composition of villages, towns, and regions and clearing land

⁵As Roskin and Berry (1997) point out: "It's easy to blame the Serbs, but understand where they are coming from psychologically. The Serbs argue: 'All right, you bastards who murdered us during World War II, if you want an independent Croatia and Bosnia, we have the right to pull the Serb areas out of your republics and gather them into a Greater Serbia, where they will be safe.' The attitude of Serbs closely parallels that of Israelis: 'We have historically been the victim of massacres, and we aren't going to take it anymore.'" In fact, there's plenty of blame to go around in Yugoslavia.

corridors to link up ethnic Serbian enclaves in Croatia and in Bosnia-Herzegovina with Serbia. These policies were (and still are) extensively applied to Bosnian Muslims and Croats. The victims were either directly driven out or intimidated to flee their homes. The methods of intimidation included murder, rape, and imprisonment in concentration camps. The Yugoslav conflict brought more than two million refugees and displaced persons. Countries such as Croatia, Austria, Italy, Germany, Hungary, Slovenia, and Turkey were put under migratory pressure. Serbia resettled ethnic Serbs in areas that were ethnically cleansed, thereby using refugees to change the demographic composition of regions and thus contributing to the creation of a Greater Serbia. . . .

The Kosovo problem constitutes one of the most dangerous crisis areas in Yugoslavia's ongoing process of disintegration. The origins of this problem can be traced back to the creation of an independent Albanian state after the defeat of Turkey in the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. The independent Albania included only 50 percent of the Albanian population in the area. A great number of Albanians remained in Kosovo, an Ottoman province, most of which was given to Serbia. Today there are more than 2 million Albanians in Kosovo (an overwhelming majority of them are Muslims; the figure includes 15,000 Turks) and they account for over 90 percent of the population, the remaining 10 percent being Serbian and Montenegrin. However, the Serbs regard Kosovo as their historic heartland. Kosovo was the cradle of the medieval Serbian state. [See Figure 13.9.] It is the historic battlefield where the Serbs fought against the Ottomans in 1389. It is also a region containing many Orthodox churches and monasteries. These factors make the province a cultural and spiritual centre for the Serbs. Kosovo has greatly contributed to the formation of a Serbian collective memory and consciousness, and this has become particularly significant in the process of building a Serbian state based on ethnic nationalism.

While the Serbs view Kosovo as a part of the Serbian historical patrimony that cannot be negotiable, the Albanians base their claims on self-determination. Kosovo was in fact a self-governing province of Serbia in terms of the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution. Kosovo had its semi-autonomous status gradually eroded by the central government in Belgrade in 1990–1991. The basic cultural and educational rights of the Albanian population were abrogated. The Serbian authorities shut down the Albanian language schools. They dismissed Albanians from the police force, which has been totally serbianized. Belgrade also reinforced the local security force by sending in Serbian and Montenegrin military units. Moreover, the economy was almost entirely serbianized. Most of the Albanian workers and managers were replaced with the Serbs.

The Albanians, for their part, took measures to set up their own state organization in a gradual and clandestine manner. In September 1991 they held a referendum in which they voted for a "sovereign and independent" Kosovo. In May 1992 they held elections [and elected the moderate intellectual Ibrahim Rugova]. They also set up an underground school system financed by parents. Despite these efforts, the Kosovars have not been able to develop an effective means to defend themselves should the fighting spread to Kosovo. The lack of adequate defensive means, on the one hand, and the offensive Serbian strategy on the other, have brought about a very deep sense of insecurity, not only in Kosovo but also in Albania. It should be noted that this feeling of insecurity, combined with the measures of democratization in Albania and Kosovo, increased the assertiveness of Albanians. As a matter of fact, the democratic elections in both countries have further increased popular pressure for an Albanian-Kosovar reunion.



Figure 13.9 Former borders of Serbia.

Nevertheless, in spite of popular pressure, Albanian authorities in both countries prevented numerous incidents from escalating to all-out conflict. [Remember that this was published in 1993.] Moreover, many Albanians seem willing to accept some form of autonomy within a new Yugoslavia. But this type of settlement is abhorred by the Milosevic administration which still views Kosovo as an integral part of a unitary Serbia.

The Albanians are careful not to provide the Serbian authorities with an excuse for a violent crackdown and the Albanian government has been urging the Kosovars to contribute to a peaceful solution of the Kosovo problem. But Albanian leaders have repeatedly declared that ethnic cleansing in Kosovo would not be tolerated by Tirana [Albania's capital] and would lead to Albania's military intervention.

► **THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR**

February 17, 1993; Copyright © 1993 Lee Malis/Spectrum Pictures. Reprinted by permission.

Bosnia: The Flight from Ethnic Cleansing

by Lee Malis
(photos by Lee Malis)

Travnik, Bosnia-Herzegovina—The war in Bosnia continues. Diplomats still talk about what needs to be done, and how to make it stand once it is agreed upon. But the television news broadcasts say the bombings continue in Sarajevo. Another Bosnian village with a strange name falls to Serbian militias, and another massacre occurs in an unfamiliar place. Muslims try to retake eastern towns, and Serbs block UN attempts to break through with aid.

I have worked in the former Yugoslavia three times over the past two years as a freelance photographer for US magazines. During my first trip to Sarajevo, my guide was killed, a young Spanish photographer I had become friends with died, and my friend who is an Associated Press photographer was wounded.

Hundreds of other men, women, and children also died in those two or three weeks in Sarajevo.

On my last trip, in late November, I tried to make a portrait of the refugees in Travnik, a small city in the mountains of Bosnia 60 miles northwest of Sarajevo. I spent nine days living in a refugee camp there.

These were average Muslim Bosnians. They were not diplomats or generals or politicians. They were moms and dads, electricians and farmers, and children. Their names cannot be used because they have left families behind in villages under Serbian control.

There are hundreds of thousands of refugees in Bosnia, primarily because of “ethnic cleansing” by the Serbs. In Travnik and surrounding communities 20,000 to 30,000 refugees are scattered in homes, schools, and sports halls.

When the Serbs take an area, they “cleanse” cities and towns of non-Serbs, who make up about two-thirds of the Bosnian population. Just over half are Muslims, and the rest are Croatians. Those “cleansed” are either killed, sent to refugee camps or prison camps, or more often just told to leave or they will be killed. The Muslim population is taking the worst of the atrocities.



Since the war began last year [1992], Serbian militias have taken control of close to 70 percent of the country. The refugees lose their homes and belongings. When the Muslims reach a refugee camp, they can go no farther. Many European countries have closed their borders, because they say they have no more room for Bosnian refugees.

Four People Managed to Escape Through the Window

High in the mountains, in a quiet village nine miles from Travnik, are a few remnants of a family from the town of Visegrad, in eastern Bosnia. They are staying in the home of a family they have never met before, just one of thousands of families living in strangers' homes.

I was led there by a 10-year-old boy from a nearby town who spoke little English. The boy told me that I should talk with this family of refugees, because there is a survivor of a massacre there.

The family invites me into their one room. The atmosphere is brittle, as if the world is made of eggshells. The first thing they do is make coffee for everyone. It seems that if Bosnian Muslims have absolutely nothing, they will always manage to make coffee for guests.

The family consists of a woman, her child, and her parents.



In the spring of last year, the woman says, Visegrad had been taken over by Serbs. On the morning of June 13, she talked with a good friend of hers who is Serbian. The friend told her that she should get out of town as fast as possible, and try to go to another village that was safer.

When she returned home from visiting her friend, it was already too late. The Serbs were rounding up the men and taking them away. Young women were being taken to “rape hotels” for the soldiers.

The people who remained were told to leave at gunpoint. From her neighborhood, there was a group of 64 old men, women, and children. One baby girl was only two days old. They got as far as the Drina River, still in the city of Visegrad. They were stopped on the bridge that leads out of town.

There they were searched for money, jewelry, and anything else of value, and it was stolen from them. They stood on the bridge for two hours. During that time, the woman saw about 10 bodies either floating in the river or lying along its banks.

The five soldiers holding them on the bridge were all familiar to her. She had grown up with some of them and knew some of their families.

The 64 Muslims were led into a house and forced into one room. The soldiers made them take off their clothes, and their clothes were taken away.

The people waited in the room for a short time, and then the door was opened and someone threw in a bomb. It was not a regular bomb, but something that burned. In the madness, people tried to escape through the window. Then the commander came in with a machine gun and opened fire. Four people managed to escape through the window; the other 60 were killed, including her mother-in-law, with whom she lived. She herself was shot twice, once in the arm and once in the leg.

Of the people who died, she knew the names and families of 26 women, nine elderly men, and 19 children. The oldest was a 93-year-old man, and the youngest was the two-day-old baby girl.

She could not keep up with the other three who had escaped. There was a woman, the woman's son, and an elderly man. But she could only get a short distance away, where she found a sewer and crawled inside. She lay there for three days.

A Muslim woman who was still in Visegrad found her, after the other survivors said where they had last seen her. The woman administered some minor first aid, gave her food, and contacted her mother and father, who had also heard that their daughter was still alive.

They managed to come to her. In the evening, they had to crawl and walk, carrying her for more than a mile along sewage ditches to avoid being seen. Then they walked and hitchhiked 30 miles to the Muslim-held town of Gorazde, where she stayed in the hospital 22 days.

As soon as she was well enough, she was let out of the hospital to make room for others. Gorazde was under siege at the time, and the city was being bombed.

She, her son, and her parents again walked and hitchhiked through dangerous territory for five days until they reached Zenica.

During the whole interview, the mother had not said a word. She sat quietly, listening to the story, distractedly serving coffee now and then, but mostly looking down or out the window. The tears were in her eyes as the interview ended, and she was embarrassed for crying. She told the ten-year-old guide that four of her sons also have disappeared. There has been no word from them in six months.

They Have to Leave the Men Behind

A young woman says goodbye to her brother and father as she gets into a car. Her mother, sister, and a younger brother are going with her. They have to leave the men behind at the refugee center in Travnik. If the men were caught traveling, they would be put into the Bosnian Army or imprisoned by the Serbs. The family's visa is forged, but they are going to try to get out of Bosnia anyway. The women say they are afraid they will never see the older brother and father again.



► **THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR**

September 19, 1996; Copyright © 1996 by Laura Kay Rozen. Reprinted by permission.

Keeping Bosnia Whole: Why the World Cares—Five Reasons International Officials Aim for United State

by Laura Kay Rozen, special to *The Christian Science Monitor*

Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina—The international officials charged with keeping Bosnia together as a multi-ethnic state liken their task to building a house of cards—one they can only hope will get stronger with time. In the meantime, they say, only one thing will continue to be the cement holding the country together: international will.

Although last weekend's elections bolstered the power of nationalists who would split the country apart, the mediators charged with implementing the Dayton peace accords—the blueprint for peace—are now gearing up to overcome the obstacles to a united Bosnia.

But why all the effort? The cost of ethnic partition and secession, they say, would be too high for the West, as well as for the Balkans.

Specifically, there are five reasons driving the international community's efforts:

Bosnian Serb Independence Won't Work

Contrary to the nationalist aims of the Bosnian Serbs, independence of their entity, so-called Republika Srpska, is not viable, analysts say. "There is simply no real future for that little jagged piece of territory if it is not integrated into [Bosnia]," said U.S. Balkans envoy, Assistant Secretary of State John Kornblum. "It is not a place that can secede and survive."

The dividing line between the Bosnian Serb area and Muslim-Croat Federation agreed to at the Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, last November was never meant to be an international border. It is a zig-zagging and impractical line that would impede economic and political development for both sides, as well as be militarily indefensible.

"The boundaries between the Serb and Muslim-Croat parts of Bosnia are meant to be fluid," explains Ambassador Michael Steiner, deputy to UN mediator Carl Bildt.

"Besides, the Republika Srpska has nowhere to secede into. [Serbian President Slobodan] Milosevic is not going to risk international ostracization and sanctions to support a secessionist Bosnian Serb state."

A Muslim State in Europe

U.S. and European officials are particularly concerned that a Muslim minstate—what would remain if Bosnia's Croats and Serbs secede—would be manipulated by radical Islamic countries. "Europe would have a very serious problem. Radical forces are just waiting for this to happen. You would have a Gaza Strip situation here," said Steiner, referring to the area the Israelis charge is a terrorist hotbed.

"At the [Muslim-led Party for Democratic Action] SDA rally at Kosovo stadium last week, there were 70,000 people. At the left and right of the crowd, there were the radicals, shouting in Farsi," explains Steiner. "The radical fringe of SDA is still a minority. But if things go the wrong way, they will be hardened. These radical forces will become dominant." It's not what the SDA wants, he says, "but they will be used." [Authors' note: This argument represents a prejudiced point of view that automatically associates countries with Islamic majorities with radical Islamic terrorism. Nevertheless, the reporter is correctly reporting it as a concern that was voiced.]

Regional Example. Diplomats say that international sanction of Serb secession would send a message to other ethnic groups in the region that aggression and genocide are acceptable ways to achieve their territorial and national goals.

“Look, 200,000 people were killed in this war, 3 million people were forced from their homes, many by ethnic cleansing, men and women were raped, tortured, starved, and slaughtered in Europe’s first death camps since World War II. For them to let the Bosnian Serbs who sanctioned this behavior get their own state is morally despicable,” says a UN official.

U.S. Envoy Richard Holbrooke also makes a moral case for why Serb secession cannot be tolerated. “No one objected to the ‘Velvet Divorce’ of Czechoslovakia. It was done in a democratic way. . . . But what happened here is aggression. Because of the nature of the process that unfolded here, it would not have been appropriate to sanction secession or partition.”

Analysts say that many areas in the Balkans share conditions that led to ethnic conflict in Bosnia. The Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia, the Hungarians in Romania and Slovakia, the Muslims in Sandzak share the problems of ethnic minorities in undemocratic states that offer minorities few rights and security, and have equally devastated economies. These minorities and their governments are watching Bosnia closely.

Refugees. Secession would mean refugees would never be able to return to their homes which are now held by other ethnic groups, and would therefore remain a source of political and economic tension. Steiner points out that over half of Bosnia’s pre-war population—3 million people—has been displaced by the war, and are now living as refugees abroad or in refugee housing in other parts of Bosnia. The majority of refugees in Europe are Muslims who were ethnically cleansed from areas now controlled by Serbs.

Bosnian refugees are creating economic and social burdens in Croatia and Europe. Germany in particular—which has taken in more refugees than any other Western European country—has an interest in sending its 300,000 Bosnian refugees home.

“I don’t think we will ever get stabilization without allowing those refugees who want to go back,” says Steiner.

NATO Credibility

Analysts here are concerned that the failure to follow the multiethnic vision of the Dayton accord would devastate the organizations that have been sent here to implement the peace. NATO and U.S. leadership in the Bosnia peace effort would have failed to bring a permanent solution to Europe’s worst conflict since World War II.

A breakdown of the multiethnic government would likely require a long-term engagement of NATO forces in Bosnia and would place these forces in a more dangerous situation.

Officials say that international will to end a new Bosnian war after the huge effort to implement Dayton would be exhausted. They also say that renewed fighting would seriously damage the credibility of the NATO alliance, whose first active engagement was to send 60,000 forces to enforce the Bosnia peace.

▶ **U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE**
From "Erasing History: Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo"

Report released by the U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., May 1999

What began in late February 1998 as a Serb government campaign against the separatist Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) has evolved into a comprehensive, premeditated, and systematic program to ethnically cleanse the Serbian province of Kosovo of its roughly 1.7 million ethnic Albanian residents (also referred to as Kosovar Albanians). Because Serbian authorities have denied access to international monitors, documentation efforts have been too fragmented to estimate definitively the number of missing and dead. . . .

The term "ethnic cleansing" first came into use during the mass expulsions of ethnic Muslims from towns in eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992; since then, media outlets, human rights groups and governments have used it on enough occasions to require careful definition. As used in this report, ethnic cleansing is defined as the systematic and forced removal of the members of an ethnic group from a community or communities in order to change the ethnic composition of a given region. In Bosnia, many ethnically cleansed towns and regions were eventually reoccupied by members of another ethnic group (who themselves often had been cleansed).


From the beginning, the [Serbian] regime in Belgrade has deliberately misled the international community and its own people about its ethnic cleansing campaign. Counterinsurgency operations against the KLA began in late February and early March 1998, when Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs Police (MUP) attacked the villages of Likosane and Cirez. These attacks resulted in the death of 25 Kosovar Albanians, of which as many as 14 may have been summarily executed. . . .

In late March 1999, Serbian forces dramatically increased the scope and pace of their efforts, moving away from selective targeting of towns and regions suspected of KLA sympathies toward a sustained and systematic effort to ethnically cleanse the entire province of Kosovo. To date, Serb forces conducting ethnic cleansing operations have not yet tried to repopulate the over 500 towns and villages from which residents have been evicted. Some villages are now used as cover for Serb military emplacements. Many, however, remain depopulated. NATO is committed to ensuring the return of all Kosovars to their homes.



Figure 13.10 Serb attacks in Kosovo and refugee flows from Kosovo.

Source: U.S. State Department, www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/map1.html.



Since March 19, 1999, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that over 700,000 Kosovars have fled to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (211,000), Albania (404,000), Bosnia-Herzegovina (17,000) the Republic of Montenegro (62,000), and elsewhere (as of May 5, 1999). [See Figure 13.10.] The Governments of Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia, and Montenegro have provided land for camps, logistical support, and protection. NATO forces in Macedonia and Albania have helped establish transit camps. Other governments have begun to accept varying numbers of refugees to ease the pressure on the so-called “front-line” states. Even with such support, however, the front-line states will continue to bear the brunt of these mass expulsions, which has badly burdened the economies and upset the political balances of these states.

Although the media has focused almost exclusively on the story of the hundreds of thousands of exhausted refugees arriving at camps in Macedonia and Albania, another story has escaped their attention, in large part because Serbian authorities have not permitted entry into Kosovo. Those left behind in Kosovo—known as internally displaced persons, or IDPs—suffer under much worse conditions than even those faced by refugees. While independent sources have not been able to confirm reports of starvation among IDPs in Kosovo, many in all likelihood are experiencing food shortages, malnutrition, health problems, and other types of deprivation as a result of having to hide from Serbian forces for weeks in neighboring mountains and forests. Needless to say, they also likely face attack by Serbian forces. According to some reports, VJ [Yugoslav Army] units have thrown grenades from helicopters at fleeing IDPs. Shelling of civilians reportedly has been used to herd groups of refugees for later deportation.

From “Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo: An Accounting (Executive Summary)”

Report released by the U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., December 1999

“Ethnic Cleansing in Kosovo: An Accounting” is a new chapter in our effort to document the extent of human rights and humanitarian law violations in Kosovo, and to convey the size and scope of the Kosovo conflict. The information in this report is drawn from refugee accounts, NGO [nongovernmental organizations] documentation, press accounts, and declassified information from government and international organization sources.

The atrocities against Kosovar Albanians documented in this report occurred primarily between March and late June, 1999.

A central question is the number of Kosovar Albanian victims of Serbian forces in Kosovo. Many bodies were found when KFOR [U.N. Kosovo Peacekeeping Force] and the ICTY [International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia] entered Kosovo in June 1999. The evidence is also now clear that Serbian forces conducted a systematic campaign to burn or destroy bodies, or to bury the bodies, then rebury them to conceal evidence of Serbian crimes. On June 4, at the end of the conflict, the Department of State issued the last of a series of weekly ethnic cleansing reports, available at www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/rpt_990604_ksvo_ethnic.html, concluding that at least 6,000 Kosovar Albanians were victims of mass murder, with an unknown number of victims of individual killings, and an unknown number of bodies burned or destroyed by Serbian forces throughout the conflict.

The Prosecutor said her office had exhumed 2,108 bodies from 195 of the 529 known mass graves. . . . Enough evidence has emerged to conclude that probably around 10,000 Kosovar Albanians were killed by Serbian forces [see Figure 13.11].






Figure 13.11 Before and after aerial photography evidence of mass graves.
 Source: www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/rpt_9905_ethnic_ksvo_7a.html.

Death represents only one facet of Serbian actions in Kosovo. Over 1.5 million Kosovar Albanians—at least 90 percent of the estimated 1998 Kosovar Albanian population of Kosovo—were forcibly expelled from their homes. Tens of thousands of homes in at least 1,200 cities, towns, and villages have been damaged or destroyed. During the conflict, Serbian forces and paramilitaries implemented a systematic campaign to ethnically cleanse Kosovo—aspects of this campaign include the following:

- *Forcible Displacement of Kosovar Albanian Civilians:* Serbian authorities conducted a campaign of forced population movement. In contrast to actions taken during 1998, Yugoslav Army units and armed civilians joined the police in systematically expelling Kosovar Albanians at gunpoint from both villages and larger towns in Kosovo.
- *Looting of Homes and Businesses:* There are numerous reports of Serbian forces robbing residents before burning their homes. Another round of robbery occurred as Serbian forces stole from fleeing Kosovars as they crossed the border to Montenegro, Albania, or Macedonia.
- *Widespread Burning of Homes:* Over 1,200 residential areas were at least partially burned after late March, 1999. Kosovar Albanians have reported that over 500 villages were burned after March, 1999.
- *Use of Human Shields:* Refugees claim that Serbian forces used Kosovar Albanians to escort military convoys and shield facilities throughout the province. Other reporting indicates that Serbian forces intentionally positioned ethnic Albanians at sites they believed were targets for NATO airstrikes.

- *Detentions:* Serbian forces systematically separated military-aged men from the general population as Kosovars were expelled. These men were detained in facilities ranging from cement factories to prisons. Many of these detainees were forced to dig trenches and were physically abused. At least 2,000 Kosovar Albanians remain in detention in around a dozen Serbian prisons today.
- *Summary Executions:* There are accounts of summary executions at about 500 sites across Kosovo.
- *Exhumation of Mass Graves:* Serbian forces burned, destroyed, or exhumed bodies from mass graves in an attempt to destroy evidence. Some were reinterred in individual graves.
- *Rape:* There are numerous accounts indicating that the organized and individual rape of Kosovar Albanian women by Serbian forces was widespread. For example, Serbian forces systematically raped women in Djakovica and Pec, and in some cases rounded up women and took them to hotels where they were raped by troops under encouragement of their commanders. Rape is most likely an underreported atrocity because of the stigma attached to the victims in traditional Kosovar Albanian society.
- *Violations of Medical Neutrality:* Kosovar Albanian physicians, patients and medical facilities were systematically attacked. Many health care facilities were used as protective cover for military activities; NGOs report the destruction by Serbian forces of at least 100 clinics, pharmacies, and hospitals.
- *Identity Cleansing:* Kosovar Albanians were systematically stripped of identity and property documents including passports, land titles, automobile license plates, identity cards, and other forms of documentation. As much as 50 percent of the population may be without documentation. By systematically destroying schools, places of worship, and hospitals, Serbian forces sought to destroy social identity and the fabric of Kosovar Albanian society.
- *Aftermath:* Following the withdrawal of Serbian forces in June, Kosovo saw manifestations of a new set of human rights problems. These include acts of retribution against the Serb minority, including the killing of 200–400 Serb residents. In addition, as many as 23,000 conscientious objectors, draft evaders, and deserters in Serbia are threatened with legal action.

► BY THE AUTHORS

Update on the Former Yugoslavia to 2003

Bosnia

The fighting in Bosnia described in these readings was not easily brought to a halt. As definitive evidence of genocide mounted, the United Nations and North Atlantic Treaty Organization finally moved to stop the bloodshed. A “no flight” zone was declared over Bosnia, and international economic sanctions were imposed on Yugoslavia. Eventually, the ban on weapons imports into Bosnia—originally designed to douse the fire—was lifted to enable the Muslims to defend themselves. The

Bosnian Muslims then joined forces with the Croats to mount a counteroffensive against Serbian strongholds. The Croats successfully regained control of the Serb-populated regions of Croatia, and the Muslims succeeded in reestablishing some territorial corridors between their safe havens.

Finally, an on-again, off-again cease-fire was reached, and U.N. peacekeeping forces from a variety of countries, including the United States and Canada, moved in. Bosnian Serbs at that time controlled about 70 percent of Bosnia, with the Muslim-Croat alliance controlling the rest. As the economic embargo began causing real hardship, Yugoslavia's President Milosevic pressured the Bosnian Serbs to the peace table. In 1995, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher brokered a peace deal known as the *Dayton Accords* that all parties reluctantly accepted. Bosnia was to remain a multination state but divided into two autonomous parts. The Bosnian Serbs received 49 percent of the territory, which they renamed *Republika Srpska*, with 51 percent for the still-combined Muslim-Croat Federation (see Figure 13.12). Notice how the boundaries were designed to make each group's territory a contiguous whole, even if it means having a narrow corridor as a connector. This way, there is free unrestricted movement within each ethnic republic and one less excuse to restart the war.

In the Muslim-Croat Federation, the predominantly Croatian area of Bosnia known as *Herceg-Bosna* had evolved into a ministate of sorts, with stronger ties to Zagreb than to Sarajevo. While all three nations have some "multiculturalists" who favor a unified Bosnia and nationalists who favor separatism or irredentism, a July 1996 poll found that 95 percent of Bosnian Serbs and two-thirds of Bosnian Croats opposed a unified country. Only Muslims favored keeping Bosnia whole. The U.S. Department of State's policy was that, unless indicted war criminals are brought to justice, per the Dayton Accords, the festering rivalries that produced the war in the first place would prevent a lasting peace. Some European governments, however, argued that punishing the Serbs would be counterproductive because it is more important to rebuild Bosnia economically so that when the peacekeeping troops do pull out, there will be a functioning economy so that all three ethnic groups will



Figure 13.12 Bosnia-Herzegovina after the 1995 Dayton peace accords.

have a stake in preserving the peace. A large contingent of U.S. troops participate in the Bosnia Peacekeeping force (SFOR), and the United States has poured billions of dollars into Bosnia to help with reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, economic development, and military reconstruction. As of early 2001, however, the new U.S. president, George W. Bush, was questioning whether to keep U.S. peacekeeping troops in Bosnia.

Kosovo

The United States and its European allies bear some responsibility for the Kosovo crisis. The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) was a small fringe organization with little popular support for armed insurrection in Kosovo until after the Dayton peace conference. The conference excluded any Kosovar Albanian delegates, and many Albanians concluded that “the reward for nonviolence was international neglect” (Hooper, 1999).⁶ When increased Albanian unrest led to a Serbian crackdown in 1998, the U.S. unwillingness to follow through on its threats of air strikes against Yugoslavian military targets emboldened the Serbs and helped convince the Albanians to take matters into their own hands. International attempts to broker a peace settlement in February 1999 failed dismally, as Yugoslavian military, police, and paramilitary units amassed within and around Kosovo.

Having learned its lesson in Bosnia, NATO responded to Serbian attacks much faster in Kosovo, although not fast enough to stop the Serbs from ethnically cleansing most Albanians from Kosovo (see U.S. Department of State reports). On March 24, 1999, two weeks after the start of the Serbian offensive, NATO began launching air strikes against Yugoslavian military, police, television, transportation, electricity, and water supply targets. The air war eventually crippled Yugoslavia, and two to three months after the fighting began, Yugoslavia accepted a cease-fire and began to withdraw. Peacekeeping troops have been contributed by 19 NATO members (including the United States, Canada, and almost all of their European allies) as well as 18 non-NATO countries (including Russia, other Slavic former Soviet states such as Ukraine, other Muslim former Soviet states such as Azerbaijan, and Islamic Middle Eastern states such as Jordan). Peacekeeping forces are involved in rebuilding infrastructure and institutions and removing land mines but have been unable to completely prevent Albanians from revenge attacks and ethnic cleansing against the remaining Serbs. An estimated 500 to 1,000 Serbs have been murdered since the Yugoslavian Army pulled out. Many Kosovar Serbs have abandoned their homes and fled to Serbia proper, fueling another chapter in the long annals of Serbian victimhood. As in Bosnia, a *de facto* partition has taken place, with Serbs concentrating in North Mitrovica, an area adjacent to Serbia and home to a vast gold and zinc mining complex.

The UN Security Council Resolution 1244 calls for preparing Kosovo for “substantial autonomy and self-government.” In interim elections in October 2000, Ibrahim Rugova’s Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) won the majority of seats over two other parties run by former KLA leaders. All three major parties advocated eventual independence for Kosovo. As of March 2003, though technically still part of Serbia, Kosovo continues to be governed by the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), as it has been since June 1999.

⁶Hooper, James. Kosovo: America’s Balkan Problem, *Current History* (April 1999):159–164.

Macedonia

In March 2001, ethnic violence erupted in Macedonia, one of the six former republics of Yugoslavia. Bordered by Albania, Kosovo, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece, Macedonia's population is 23 percent Albanian (Figure 13.8, Table 13.1). Macedonia had been lauded as the only former Yugoslavian republic that had seceded without bloodshed. Its multinational population was thought to coexist peacefully. Less than two years after the war in Kosovo ended, however, Albanian nationalist fighters and their weapons began crossing the border from Kosovo to attack Slavic Macedonian targets in the mountainous Albanian majority zone. The rebels called for a change in the Macedonian constitution to upgrade the status of the Albanian minority—a change that would essentially partition the country along ethnic lines. Although the situation sounds hauntingly familiar, Macedonia's situation contains some unique elements. When Macedonia seceded from Yugoslavia, the neighboring state of Greece refused to recognize its independence until it agreed to change its official name to the Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) to distinguish it from the Macedonian region of Greece. Meanwhile, the neighboring state of Bulgaria has questioned whether Macedonians are a nation at all or really an offshoot of the Slavic Bulgarian nation. There is also a small Serbian minority (2 percent) in Macedonia.


Yugoslavia

In one of the most unexpected and dramatic events of the entire saga, the Serbian people succeeded in overthrowing President Slobodan Milosevic, the architect of a decade of ethnic cleansing. The Serbian people, although still strongly nationalistic, had grown tired of war, air raids, poverty, and ostracism from the international community. Average income had dropped to \$40 per month, and the streets of Belgrade had become one large flea market. Elections were held in September 2000, and by all reports the opposition party triumphed, although the government denied it. In early October 2000, after a general strike, massive crowds began gathering in the streets of Belgrade for speeches and protests. On October 5 the crowd stormed the Parliament building, and with Serbian troops unwilling to fire on their own people, the Milosevic era came to a quick, bloodless end.

In new elections on December 24, 2000, moderate reformer Vojislav Kostunica was elected President of Yugoslavia with the promise to complete democratic reforms. Many thorny issues faced the new regime, including international war crime indictments against former Serbian leaders, economic reconstruction, trade relations with other former Yugoslavian republics, and pressure for unification with, and protection of, Serbs in Bosnia and Kosovo. Yugoslavia was readmitted to the United Nations in 2001.


Montenegro

Meanwhile, the party in Montenegro favoring independence from Yugoslavia and its Serb majority narrowly won national elections in April 2001. Montenegrins, who comprise about two-thirds of the population, share a similar religion and language with the Serbs but historically have developed separately from them (Figure 13.8, Table 13.1). Prior to the downfall of Milosevic, the United States was encouraging Montenegrins to seek independence as a way of weakening the Milosevic regime in Yugoslavia. Now that Milosevic has fallen, however, the United States has done an about-face and is discouraging them because independence for any new Balkan nation could send a "green light" to the others and precipitate new wars.

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In 2002, the Serbian and Montenegrin regions of Yugoslavia began negotiations to forge a looser relationship. These talks became a reality on February 4, 2003, when their parliament restructured the country into a federation of two republics; The new state is now officially called *Serbia and Montenegro*. The two confederate republics agreed to hold a referendum in each republic in three years on whether to opt for full independence.

That the road to peace and reconstruction is not smooth was made abundantly clear on March 12, 2003, only one month after the new confederation was formed. A sniper killed the prime minister of Serbia, Zoran Djindjic, the charismatic philosopher-politician who rallied the people to oust Slobodan Milosevic in 2000. Former members of the Milosevic regime now involved in organized crime are believed to be behind the assassination. The reform-minded and pro-Western Djindjic had threatened to arrest Gen. Ratko Mladic, who is wanted by the tribunal for war crimes in Bosnia.



Name: _____ Instructor: _____

Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Nations, States, and Nation-States


► ACTIVITY 2: IRAQAPHOBIA

Activity 2 requires you to read articles and reports about Iraq (pronounced i-**rak**) and then answer questions about them. The first reading is excerpted from the U.S. Library of Congress's on-line country study of Iraq, edited by Helen Chapin Metz. The *Country Study* Web site contains on-line versions of books previously published in hard copy by the Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress under the Country Studies/Area Handbook Program sponsored by the U.S. Department of the Army. The Army originally sponsored this series to provide background on regions in which U.S. forces might be deployed. "The books represent the analysis of the authors and should not be construed as an expression of an official United States Government position, policy, or decision." More than 100 countries are covered; some, such as Afghanistan, have just recently been added. The authors of *Human Geography in Action* have selected various sections of *Iraq: A Country Study* to weave into a narrative of Iraq prior to the Gulf War in 1991. The Iraq Country Study has not been updated since 1988, but because your next reading covers the decade since Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the two sources make a great pairing.

The second source, from CNN.com, is a text adaptation of a CNN video report, *The Unfinished War: A Decade Since Desert Storm*. It is a kind of major in-depth piece that a media giant such as CNN can undertake, and it does a very good job of summarizing the 10 to 15 years leading up to the current crisis.



Figure 13.13 Area comparison between Iraq and the United States. Source: *Atlas of the Middle East*, CIA, 1993.



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The third source is a section from an article by James Fallows in *The Atlantic Monthly*, a publication that is a wonderful source of in-depth articles on the contemporary world and often features geographical topics. Fallows is a former editor of *The Atlantic Monthly* and *U.S. News and World Report*. He also served as President Jimmy Carter's chief speechwriter from 1977 to 1979. In 2001, Fallows wrote an article on the possibility of a U.S. invasion of Iraq, which he titled "The Fifty-First State." In it, he proposed that it might be extremely difficult to extricate the United States from Iraq even after a successful victory over Saddam's forces. To the victor, he argues, goes the responsibility of setting up a stable government to replace the ousted one. In the section we have selected, subtitled "Territorial Integrity," Fallows explains that the ethnic geography within Iraq will make it extremely difficult to hold Iraq together as a single state yet will make it impossible to break it up along ethnic lines.

Finally, the authors' epilogue summarizes the events up to May 9, 2003, as the post-war reconstruction of Iraq was beginning. The readings do not include anything from early 2003 because, to be able to class-test the activity on real students and still meet our publication deadline, we had to finish it by the start of the spring semester, 2003. Nothing during early 2003 fundamentally altered the political geography of the nations and states of the region.

► ACTIVITY 2 READINGS

Cable News Network (CNN.com). 2001. *The Unfinished War: A Decade Since Desert Storm*: www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2001/gulf.war/unfinished/war/index.html.

Fallows, James. 2002. The Fifty-First State? *The Atlantic Monthly* 290(4):53–64: www.theatlantic.com/issues/2002/11/fallows.htm.

Metz, Helen Chapin (ed.). 1990. *Iraq: A Country Study*, 4th ed. Library of Congress, Federal Research Division. Area Handbook Series: lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/igtoc.html.

► QUESTIONS

(Note: Answers to questions marked by * cannot be obtained directly in the readings. You'll need to think critically about the readings and apply concepts properly to figure them out.)

A. From Ancient Times to the Creation of Iraq

Refer to *Iraq: A Country Study*, the sections on "Historical Background" and "Enter Britain."

2.1. What is the ancient name of the area presently called Iraq? _____

Name one of the ancient civilizations that flourished there. _____

2.2. What are the two main rivers running through the region?

_____ and _____

2.3. Iraq's many autonomous social units, its lack of stone for road building, its location at the eastern flank of the Arab world, and the periods when the irrigation systems fell into disrepair—all of these were forces of political _____. (centralization or fragmentation)



2.4. What outside empire dominated this region in the several centuries prior to World War I? _____.

2.5. After World War I, control of Iraq was given to what country? _____.
What international organization gave control of Iraq to them?
_____.

2.6. The boundaries of Iraq were drawn by _____
with virtually no consideration of _____

_____.

2.7. Iraq became independent in what year? _____

2.8. Iraq's first type of government was _____.
(communism, democracy, military dictatorship, or monarchy).

B. Nation and State Geography

Refer to Iraq: A Country Study, sections on "Religious Background," "Language Background," "Kurdish Background," and "Religion/Language Summary" and Figures 13.15, 13.17, and 3.4.

2.9. In which half-century did Islam arrive in the area that is now Iraq (see Figure 3.4. in Chapter 3)? _____

2.10. What historical event is responsible for the divide between Sunni Moslems and Shia Moslems?

_____.

2.11. What are the five pillars of Islam? Give the Arabic words and explain each one.

_____.

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2.12. What is the official language of Iraq? _____

2.13. Iraq is a _____. (nation, state, nation-state)*

2.14. The Kurds are a _____, and Kurdistan is a _____
(nation, state, nation-state, national homeland)*

2.15. Fill in the following table, based on your readings and maps:

	Language	Religious Affiliation (sect)	Percent of Iraqi Population	Region of Iraq (e.g., north, west, central, etc.)
Iraqi Shia				
Iraqi Sunni Arabs				
Iraqi Kurds				
Kuwaiti majority			n.a.	n.a.
Iranian majority			n.a.	n.a.

2.16. List four of the five smaller ethnic groups present within Iraq.

C. The Iran-Iraq War

Refer to Iraq: A Country Study, the section on "Enter Saddam," and its text box on U.S. Support of Saddam Hussein, and Figures 13.15, 13.17, and 13.18.

2.17. Saddam Hussein, a member of the Sunni Arab minority, emerged as Iraq's leader in the mid-19____s (specify a decade).

2.18. In 1980, Iraq invaded Iran. What was the importance of the territory over which Iran and Iraq were fighting?

2.19. This territory, however important, was not the only reason for Iraq's attack on Iran. Why was Saddam Hussein "threatened by the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and by its potential influence on Iraq's majority population?" (Refer to the table in Question 2.15. and your knowledge of Islam for your answer.)*

2.20. Which country did the United States support in the Iran-Iraq war from 1980 to 1988? _____

Why? _____

2.21. Name three specific kinds of support the United States offered to Saddam Hussein's regime during the Iran-Iraq war that now could be used against the United States or its allies.

D. The Gulf War

Refer to Iraq: A Country Study, sections on "Enter Saddam" and "The Unfinished War: A Decade Since Desert Storm," sections on "Introduction" and "Intent vs. Effect" and Figures 13.15 and 13.17.

2.22. In 1990, Iraq invaded _____.

2.23. Iraq's reasons for the invasion include _____

2.24. The people of the invaded country differ from Saddam's Sunni/Arab nation on the basis of (check one; see the table in Question 2.15):

language _____
 religious group _____
 both _____
 neither _____

2.25. After the Gulf War in 1991, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 687 and established the U.N. Special Commission (UNSCOM) to

2.26. Because of Iraq's noncompliance with UNSCOM, rather than invade again, the United Nations imposed _____ on Iraq. Critics blame these for _____

despite the U.N.'s "_____ for _____" program.

E. Will Iraq Stay Together? The Geography of Nations and States

Refer to The Unfinished War, sections on "Coups and Uprisings" and "Keeping the Kurds Safe," "The Fifty-First State," and Figures 13.15, 13.17, and 13.23.

2.27. During the Gulf War, President George Bush urged the Iraqi Kurds and Iraqi Shia to revolt against Saddam Hussein. These revolts against their own state are examples of _____. (ethnonationalism or irredentism)*

2.28. The United States chose not to support the rebellion because of the worry "that a fractured Iraq would create more _____ in an unpredictable region."

2.29. The no-fly zone over northern Iraq was imposed to protect _____ from air attacks by _____. Similarly, the southern no-fly zone protected the _____ people.

2.30. Since the Gulf War and the imposition of the no-fly zones, the Iraqi Kurds have effectively operated under a form of regional _____, which allows them to govern their own internal affairs and teach their schools in their own language.*

One reason the United States abandoned the Kurdish revolt after the Gulf War was pressure from Turkey, which has long been an especially important ally of the United States for several reasons. First, it serves as a successful model of a secular (nonreligious), democratic, industrializing country for other Islamic countries in the Middle East. Second, during the Cold War against the communist Soviet Union, Turkey's government allowed the United States to have military bases within its country on the Soviet Union's southern periphery. Third, Turkey maintains normal relations with Israel. Fourth, Turkey is of extreme geopolitical importance, commanding as it does the entrance to the Black Sea and the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. Turkey is positioned at the crossroads of Europe, Asia, and Africa, near the oil-rich Middle East and the shatterbelts of the Balkans and Caucasus Mountains.

2.31. Hypothetically, if the Iraqi Kurds were to establish an independent state of Kurdistan and the Turkish Kurds were to revolt in an attempt to join their part of Turkey to the new Kurdistan, this would be a case of _____. (ethnonationalism or irredentism)* (*Hint: Would the Kurds be a multistate nation, or would Kurdistan be a multinational state?*)

2.32. According to James Fallows, the Arab Sunnis have dominated Iraq's government despite their minority status because _____

2.33. Arab governments in the Persian Gulf, such as the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia, fear the possible breakup of Iraq because _____

2.34. Chaos in the Persian Gulf would disrupt world _____ markets and therefore the world economy.

2.35. If, as Fallows suggests, the Shia government in Iran tried to "reclaim" the Shia region of southern Iraq on the basis of a common national religion, it would best be described as _____. (ethnonationalism or irredentism)*

► ACTIVITY 2 READINGS

► THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

Adapted by the authors from: **Iraq: A Country Study**

Helen Chapin Metz, editor.

Historical Background

Iraq became a sovereign, independent state in 1932. Although the modern state, the Republic of Iraq, is quite young, the history of the land and its people dates back more than 5,000 years. Indeed, Iraq contains the world's richest known archaeological sites. Here, in ancient Mesopotamia ("the land between the rivers"), the first civilization—that of Sumer—appeared in the Near East, followed later by Babylon and Assyria. Despite the millennium separating the two epochs, Iraqi history displays a continuity shaped by adaptation to the ebbings and flowings of the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers. (Figure 13.14). Allowed to flow unchecked, the rivers wrought destruction in terrible floods that inundated whole towns. When the rivers were controlled by irrigation dikes and other waterworks, the land became extremely fertile.

Mesopotamia could also be an extremely threatening environment, however, driving its peoples to seek security from the vicissitudes of nature. Throughout Iraqi



Figure 13.14 The Tigris and Euphrates rivers have been the water source for agriculture and the lifeblood for civilization for millennia.

history, various groups have formed autonomous, self-contained social units that exerted a powerful fragmenting force on Iraqi culture. Two other factors that have inhibited political centralization are the absence of stone and Iraq's geographic location as the eastern flank of the Arab world [see Chapter 2, Activity 1: Middle East Culture Region]. For much of Iraqi history, the lack of stone has severely hindered the building of roads. As a result, many parts of the country have remained beyond government control. Also, because it borders non-Arab Turkey and Iran and because of the great agricultural potential of its river valley, Iraq has attracted waves of ethnically diverse migrations. Although this influx of people has enriched Iraqi culture, it also has disrupted the country's internal balance and has led to deep-seated schisms.

Throughout Iraqi history, the conflict between political fragmentation and centralization has been reflected in the struggles among tribes and cities for the food-producing flatlands of the river valleys. When a central power neglected to keep the waterworks in repair, land fell into disuse, and tribes attacked settled peoples for precious and scarce agricultural commodities. For nearly 600 years, between the collapse of the Abbasid Empire in the thirteenth century and the waning years of the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century, government authority was tenuous and tribal Iraq was, in effect, autonomous. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Iraq's disconnected—and often antagonistic—ethnic, religious, and tribal social groups professed little or no allegiance to the central government. As a result, the all-consuming concern of contemporary Iraqi history has been the forging of a nation-state out of this diverse and conflict-ridden social structure and the concomitant transformation of parochial loyalties, both tribal and ethnic, into a national identity.

Enter Britain

By the beginning of the twentieth century, enfeebled Ottoman rule had invited intense competition among European powers for commercial benefits and for spheres of influence. The British feared that a hostile German presence in the Fertile Crescent would threaten British oil interests in Iran and perhaps even India itself. In 1914 when the British discovered that Turkey, home of the Ottomans, was entering the war on the side of the Germans, British forces from India landed, and by March 1917 the British had captured Baghdad. At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, under the League of Nations Covenant, Iraq was formally made a Class-A mandate entrusted to Britain. [A *mandate* was a mechanism for the winning powers of World War I to

temporarily take over the former colonies of the losing powers and prepare them for independence.]

The League of Nations actually granted a broad swath of formerly Ottoman territory to Britain, from Egypt to Iraq, as mandated territory. As the controlling power, Britain was able to define the boundaries of the countries to be created out of the mandated territory. Britain defined the territorial limits of Iraq with little correspondence to natural frontiers or traditional tribal and ethnic settlements. Britain also paid little heed to Iraq's need for a port at the Tigris' and Euphrates' outlet to the Persian Gulf, a delta area known as the Shatt al Arab. Britain made Kuwait a separate territory and eventually a separate state, pinching Iraq's access to the Gulf.

Between 1918 and 1958, British policy in Iraq had far-reaching effects. At the Cairo Conference of 1921, the British chose Emir Faisal ibn Hussain as Iraq's first King. The British saw in Faisal a leader who possessed sufficient nationalist and Islamic credentials to have broad appeal, but as a Saudi Arabian he was also vulnerable enough to remain dependent on their support. Faisal traced his descent from the family of the Prophet Muhammad, and his ancestors had held political authority in the holy cities of Mecca and Medina since the tenth century. From 1921 to 1932, Iraq remained a British mandate territory that Faisal ruled with the permission and guidance of the British. After independence from Britain in 1932, the monarchy lasted until a coup d'état ended the reign of Faisal's grandson, King Faisal II, in 1958.

Ultimately, the British-created monarchy suffered from a chronic legitimacy crisis: The concept of a monarchy was alien to Iraq. Despite his Islamic and pan-Arab credentials, Faisal was not an Iraqi, and, no matter how effectively he ruled, Iraqis saw the monarchy as a British creation. The majority of Iraqis were divorced from the political process, and the process itself failed to develop procedures for resolving internal conflicts other than rule by decree and the frequent use of repressive measures. Also, because the formative experiences of Iraq's post-1958 political leadership centered around clandestine opposition activity, decision-making and government activity in general have been veiled in secrecy. Furthermore, because the country lacks deeply rooted national political institutions, political power frequently has been monopolized by a small elite, the members of which are often bound by close family or tribal ties.

Religious Background

Islam came to Iraq by way of the Arabian Peninsula, where in A.D. 610, Muhammad—a merchant in the Arabian town of Mecca—began to preach the first of a series of revelations granted him by God through the angel Gabriel. A fervent monotheist, Muhammad denounced the polytheism of his fellow Meccans, which because the town's economy was based in part on a thriving pilgrimage business to the shrine called the Kaaba and numerous other pagan religious sites in the area, earned him the enmity of the town's leaders. In A.D. 622 he and a group of followers accepted an invitation to settle in the town of Yathrib, later known as Medina. The move, or *hegira*, marks the beginning of the Islamic era and of Islam as a force in history; the Muslim calendar begins in A.D. 622. In Medina, Muhammad continued to preach and eventually defeated his detractors in battle. He consolidated the temporal and the spiritual leadership in his person before his death in A.D. 632. After Muhammad's death, his followers compiled those of his words regarded as coming directly from God into the *Quran* (or *Koran*), the holy scriptures of Islam.

After Muhammad's death, the leaders of the Muslim community consensually chose Abu Bakr, the Prophet's father-in-law and one of his earliest followers, to succeed him. At that time, some persons favored Ali, Muhammad's cousin and the husband of his daughter Fatima, but Ali and his supporters (the *Shiat Ali*, or Party of Ali) eventually recognized the community's choice. The next two caliphs (successors) enjoyed the recognition of the entire community. When Ali finally succeeded to the caliphate in A.D. 656, Muawiyah, governor of Syria, rebelled. After the ensuing civil war, Ali moved his capital to Iraq, where he was murdered shortly thereafter.

Ali's death ended the last of the so-called four orthodox caliphates and the period in which the entire community of Islam recognized a single caliph. Muawiyah proclaimed himself caliph from Damascus. The *Shiat Ali* refused to recognize him or his line and withdrew to establish the dissident sect, known as the *Shias*, supporting the claims of Ali's line to the caliphate based on descent from the Prophet. The larger faction, the *Sunnis*, adhered to the position that the caliph must be elected. This ancient schism accounts for contemporary Islam's separate Sunni and Shia sects (Figure 13.15).

Originally political, the differences between Sunni and Shia interpretations rapidly took on theological and metaphysical overtones. In principle, a Sunni approaches God directly; there is no clerical hierarchy. Some duly appointed religious figures, however, exert considerable social and political power. *Imams* usually are men of importance in their communities, but they need not have any formal training; among the Bedouins, for example, any tribal member may lead communal prayers. Shia Muslims, also known as *Shiites*, hold the fundamental beliefs of other Muslims. But, in addition to these tenets, the distinctive institution of Shia Islam is the Imamate—a much more exalted position than the Sunni imam, who is primarily a prayer leader. In contrast to Sunni Muslims, who view the caliph as only a temporal leader who lacks a hereditary view of Muslim leadership, Shia Muslims believe the Prophet




Figure 13.15 Major religions in and around Iraq.

Muhammad designated Ali to be his successor as Imam, exercising both spiritual and temporal leadership. Each Imam in turn designated his successor—through 12 Imams—each holding the same powers (Figure 13.16).


The duties of Muslims form the five pillars of Islam, which set forth the acts necessary to demonstrate and reinforce the faith. These are the recitation of the *shahada* (“There is no God but God, and Muhammad is his prophet”), daily prayer (*salat*), almsgiving (*zakat*), fasting (*sawm*), and pilgrimage (*hajj*). The believer is to pray in a prescribed manner after purification through ritual ablutions each day at dawn, midday, midafternoon, sunset, and nightfall. Prescribed genuflections and prostrations accompany the prayers, which the worshiper recites facing toward Mecca. Whenever possible, men pray in congregation at the mosque with an imam, and on Fridays make a special effort to do so. The Friday noon prayers provide the occasion for weekly sermons by religious leaders. Women may also attend public worship at the mosque, where they are segregated from the men, although most frequently women pray at home. A special functionary, the *muezzin*, intones a call to prayer to the entire community at the appropriate hour. Those out of earshot determine the time by the sun.

The ninth month of the Muslim calendar is Ramadan, a period of obligatory fasting in commemoration of Muhammad’s receipt of God’s revelation. Throughout the month all but the sick and weak, pregnant or lactating women, soldiers on duty, travelers on necessary journeys, and young children are enjoined from eating, drinking, smoking, and sexual intercourse during the daylight hours.

All Muslims, at least once in their lifetime, should make the *hajj* to Mecca to participate in special rites held there during the twelfth month of the lunar calendar. Muhammad instituted this requirement, modifying pre-Islamic custom, to emphasize sites associated with God and Abraham (Ibrahim), founder of monotheism and father of the Arabs through his son Ismail.



Figure 13.16 The ayatollah of an Iraqi Shiite Muslim group prays with his followers. Photos on the wall are portraits of the ayatollah’s eight brothers and other martyrs who have been killed by the Iraqi regime.



The lesser pillars of the faith, which all Muslims share, are *jihad*, or the crusade to protect Islamic lands, beliefs, and institutions, and the requirement to do good works and to avoid all evil thoughts, words, and deeds. In addition, Muslims agree on certain basic principles of faith based on the teachings of the Prophet Muhammad: there is one God, who is a unitary divine being in contrast to the trinitarian belief of Christians; Muhammad, the last of a line of prophets beginning with Abraham and including Moses and Jesus, was chosen by God to present His message to humanity; and there is a general resurrection on the last or judgment day.

Islam is a system of religious beliefs and an all-encompassing way of life. Muslims believe that God (Allah) revealed to the Prophet Muhammad the rules governing society and the proper conduct of society's members. It is incumbent on the individual therefore to live in a manner prescribed by the revealed law (*sharia*) and on the community to build the perfect human society on earth according to holy injunctions. Islam recognizes no distinctions between church and state. The distinction between religious and secular law is a recent development that reflects the more pronounced role of the state in society, and Western economic and cultural penetration. The impact of religion on daily life in Muslim countries is far greater than that found in the West since the Middle Ages.

Language Background


Arabic is the official language and mother tongue of about 76 percent of the population and is understood by a majority of others. The term *Arab* therefore refers to people from Morocco to Iraq who speak Arabic as their primary language [see Chapter 2, Activity 1: Middle East Culture Region]. One of the Semitic languages, Arabic is related to Aramaic, Phoenician, Syriac, Hebrew, various Ethiopic languages, and the Akkadian of ancient Babylonia and Assyria. Minorities speak Turkic, Armenian, and Persian (Figure 13.17).

The other main language spoken in Iraq is Kurdish, spoken by Iraq's Kurdish minority. Kurdish is not a mere dialect of Farsi or Persian, as many Iranian nationalists maintain, and it is certainly not a variant of the Semitic or Turkic tongues. It is a separate language, part of the Indo-European family.

Kurdish Background

Kurds represent by far the largest non-Arab ethnic minority, accounting in 1987 for about 19 percent of the population, or around 3.1 million. Ranging across northern Iraq, the Kurds are part of the larger Kurdish population (probably numbering close to 16 million) that inhabits the wide arc from eastern Turkey and the northwestern part of Syria through Soviet Azerbaijan and Iraq to the northwest of the Zagros Mountains in Iran. [Note: CNN.com reports the total Kurdish population in 2001 as 25 million.] Although the largest numbers live in Turkey (variously estimated at between 3 and 10 million), it is in Iraq that they are most active politically. Although the government hotly denies it, the Kurds are almost certainly a majority in the region around Kirkuk, Iraq's richest oil-producing area.

The Kurds inhabit the highlands and mountain valleys and have traditionally been organized on a tribal basis. Historians have traced the Kurds' existence in these mountains back at least 3,000 years, and throughout their history they have been feared as fierce warriors. Once mainly nomadic or semi-nomadic, Kurdish society was characterized by a combination of urban centers, villages, and pastoral tribes since at least the Ottoman period. The migration to the cities, particularly of the young intelligentsia, helped develop Kurdish nationalism in the twentieth century.






Figure 13.17 Major languages in and around Iraq.


The historic enmity between the Kurds and Iraq's Arabic-speaking central government has contributed to the tenacious survival of Kurdish culture. The Kurds' most distinguishing characteristic and the one that binds them to one another is their language. The Kurds have been locked in an unremittingly violent struggle with the central government in Baghdad almost since the founding of the Iraqi republic in 1958. It appeared in the early 1970s that the dissident Kurds—under the generalship of the legendary leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani—might actually carve out an independent Kurdish area in northern Iraq. The war between Iraq and Iran that broke out in 1980 afforded Iraqi Kurdish groups the opportunity to intensify their opposition to the government.

Religion/Language Summary

At least 95 percent of the population adheres to some form of Islam. The government gives the number of Shias as 55 percent but probably 60 to 65 percent is a reasonable figure. Most Iraqi Shias are Arabs. Almost all Kurds, approximately 19 percent of population, are Sunnis. About 13 percent are Sunni Arabs, including Saddam Hussein and most past rulers of Iraq. The remainder of the population includes small numbers of Turkomans, mostly Sunni Muslims; Assyrians and Armenians, predominantly Christians; Yazidis, of Kurdish stock with a syncretistic faith; and a few Jews.

Enter Saddam

Between the overthrow of the monarchy in 1958 and the emergence of Saddam Hussein in the mid-1970s, Iraqi history was a chronicle of conspiracies, coups, countercoups, and fierce Kurdish uprisings. Saddam finally became president of Iraq in



1979 after gradually becoming the moving force behind his party. Beginning in 1975, however, with the signing of the Algiers Agreement—an agreement between Saddam Hussein and the Shah of Iran that effectively ended Iranian military support for the Kurds in Iraq—Saddam Hussein was able to bring Iraq an unprecedented period of stability. He effectively used rising oil revenues to fund large-scale development projects, to increase public sector employment, and significantly to improve education and health care. This tied increasing numbers of Iraqis to the ruling Baath (Arab Socialist Resurrection) Party. As a result, for the first time in contemporary Iraqi history, an Iraqi leader successfully forged a national identity out of Iraq's diverse social structure. Saddam Hussein's achievements and Iraq's general prosperity, however, did not survive long. Threatened by the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and by its potential influence on Iraq's majority population, Iraq attacked Iran on September 22, 1980.

The border with Iran had been a continuing source of conflict and was partially responsible for the outbreak in 1980 of the Iran-Iraq war. The terms of a treaty negotiated in 1937 under British auspices provided that in one area of the Shatt al Arab, the boundary would be at the low-water mark on the Iranian side (Figure 13.18). The narrow Shatt is Iraq's only access to ocean transportation. Iran subsequently insisted that the 1937 treaty was imposed on it by "British imperialist pressures." Through Algerian mediation, Iran and Iraq agreed in March 1975 to define the common border all along the Shatt estuary as the middle of the main channel. To compensate Iraq for the loss of what formerly had been regarded as its territory, pockets of territory along the mountain border in the central sector of its common boundary with Iran were assigned to it. Nonetheless, in September 1980 Iraq went to war with Iran, citing among other complaints the fact that Iran had not turned over to it the land specified in the Algiers Accord. [See the box, "U.S. Support of Iraq in the 1980s."]

U.S. Support of Saddam Hussein in the 1980s

According to *Newsweek*, "American officials have known that Saddam was a psychopath" since the early 1970s. Yet after radical Islamic fundamentalists overthrew the pro-American, westernized Shah of Iran in 1979 and took U.S. embassy employees hostage, the Reagan administration was eager to use Saddam as a "surrogate" against Iran. When Iran's "human wave attacks" began to tilt the balance in the Iran-Iraq war, the United States began providing Iraq with assistance that would give it an edge against its common enemy, Iran (Figure 13.19). The United States provided Saddam with satellite photos, tanks, "dual-use" (commercial-military) equipment such as database software, helicopters, and video surveillance equipment. Most troubling, the United States also shipped chemical analysis equipment and "bacteria/fungi/protozoa," which could be used to make anthrax, to the Iraqi Atomic Energy Commission. It is not known for certain whether any of the materials provided by the Americans were used by Iraq against its own people. After the Iran-Iraq War, *Newsweek* writes that "the State Department was equivocating with Saddam right up to the moment he invaded Kuwait in August 1990."

Source: Dickey, Christopher and Evan Thomas. 2002. How Saddam Happened. *Newsweek* (Sept. 23, 2002):34–41.






Figure 13.18 The changing Iraq-Iran boundary along the Shatt al Arab waterway over the years.

In 1988 the boundary with Kuwait was another outstanding problem. It was fixed in a 1913 treaty between the Ottoman Empire and British officials acting on behalf of Kuwait's ruling family, which in 1899 had ceded control over foreign affairs to Britain. The boundary was accepted by Iraq when it became independent in 1932, but in the 1960s and again in the mid-1970s, the Iraqi government seized parts of Kuwait, basing its claim on the fact that Kuwait was part of the Basra Province of the Ottoman Empire, the rest of which went to Iraq, and therefore was unfairly separated from Iraq by Britain. Kuwait made several representations to the Iraqis during the war to fix the border once and for all, but Baghdad repeatedly demurred, claiming that the issue was a potentially divisive one that could enflame nationalist sentiment inside Iraq. On August 2, 1990, Iraq attacked and then annexed Kuwait. Iraqi president Saddam Hussein accused Kuwait of illegally pumping oil from Iraq's Rumaila oil field, which spans the border; of not paying off its debt to Iraq



Figure 13.19 Iranian soldiers, some only children, shout “Allahu Akhbar” or God is Great, during the Iran-Iraq war of 1980–1988.

for defending the Arab nation against the Persians (Iran); and of refusing to negotiate Iraq’s needs for a deepwater port at the Shatt al Arab.

Sources: *Iraq: A Country Study* (sections on “Boundaries”; “Historical Setting”; “National Security”; “World War I and the British Mandate”; “Islam”; “Kurds”; “Religious Life”; “Shias”; “Society”; “Sunnis”; and “The People”).

► CABLE NEWS NETWORK (CNN.COM)

A text adaptation of CNN’s Special Report, “The Unfinished War: A Decade Since Desert Storm,” hosted by Brent Sadler, which debuted on Tuesday, January 16, 2001, on CNN and CNN International.

The Unfinished War: A Decade Since Desert Storm

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CNN—Ten years ago, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein pledged his troops to the “Mother of all Battles,” but Operation Desert Storm then quickly drove his armies from Kuwait. Yet, despite Iraq’s crushing military collapse and a decade of crippling sanctions, Hussein still holds power in Iraq, seemingly unshaken by plots to eliminate him.

In the decade since the end of Desert Storm, much has changed. Iraq, once an outcast on the world stage, is now coming in from the cold. The once-united Western alliance has given way to a divided United Nations.

Hussein has ruled Iraq for almost 25 years. Some say with an iron hand.

"I think Saddam as a person represents one of the darkest forces in modern Arab history," says U.S. Assistant Secretary of State David Welch. "Here is a person who, for the sake of his own grasp for power and ambition, has been willing to execute hundreds, thousands, of his own citizens."

Former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft believes that Hussein is "one of the most ruthless people that the world has ever seen."

"One of the reasons he has been so successful," Scowcroft says, "is that he terrifies everyone who works for him—like personally executing people in front of his colleagues, or having somebody execute his best friend to show his loyalty."

Said K. Aburish, author of "Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge," calls the Iraqi leader "a thug."

"But a thug who is the most methodical Arab leader of this century," he adds. Aburish says Hussein is tribal in his thinking.

"You can look at him as two people—a man who operates out of the 17th century. And a man whose foot is in the 20th century and he's marching very fast into the 21st century," Aburish explains.

And time and again, his ambitions for himself and for his nation have led him into conflict. In 1980, Iraq started an eight-year war with neighboring Iran. That prolonged battle left Iraq in dire economic straits. So Hussein borrowed money from his Arab neighbors, including Kuwait. When Kuwait began to call in those debts and pump oil from a disputed border field, Hussein responded by flexing his muscles, again.

On August 2, 1990, Iraqi troops crossed the border into Kuwait.

"What was at work at that particular time was the fact that he's insulted by people who are not entitled to insult him," Aburish explains.

So when he felt insulted by the Kuwaitis, Aburish says, he went in to teach them a lesson.

"World politics overall, the reaction of the West, he didn't think of that one single bit," says Aburish. "His tribal mind superseded his modern mind in that case."

In fact, Hussein's squabble with Kuwait triggered the world's largest military operation since World War II. In response to the Iraqi aggression, a military coalition of 34 countries was formed. The United States, Great Britain, France and Russia, with the crucial support of Arab nations like Saudi Arabia, Syria and Egypt, drew up their forces in the deserts to the south and west of Iraq and Kuwait.

The entire Middle East appeared to be at risk from Hussein's weapons of mass destruction. He had an active nuclear weapons program, hundreds of short- and medium-range missiles, and an arsenal of chemical munitions.

Plus, Iraq's military had used poison gas against the Iranians during the Iran-Iraq War (Iran also used chemical weapons during the conflict). Hussein has also used mustard gas against his own people in the Kurdish town of Halabja, where hundreds died. According to Physicians for Human Rights, trace elements of the nerve agent sarin were discovered after an assault on the village of Birjinni.

As the Gulf War began, there was widespread fear that Hussein would try to escalate the conflict by using non-conventional weapons. Over the course of the war, more than 70 SCUD missiles would strike targets in Israel and the Gulf states. But

in the end, Hussein never did launch, as many had feared he might, a non-conventional warhead.

Nevertheless, the fears and suspicions of the international community did not go away after Iraq succumbed to Desert Storm. They led the United Nations Security Council to adopt Resolution 687, empowering a unique team of U.N. inspectors to destroy Iraq's capacity to use or make such weapons. The strict economic sanctions imposed on Iraq since the invasion of Kuwait were to remain in place until full compliance was assured.

An international group of scientists, engineers and weapons specialists assembled to ensure Iraq complied with U.N. Security Council demands to disclose, destroy, or render harmless all weapons of mass destruction. The team was called the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM).

In 1991, the first UNSCOM weapons inspectors began work in Iraq. Former U.S. Marine intelligence specialist Scott Ritter was one of them.

"The inspection I was involved in was a no-notice, intrusive, on-site inspection, designed to uncover evidence of how Iraq was hiding their weapons," explains Ritter. "We didn't expect them to cooperate. We knew it would be confrontational" (Figure 13.20).



Figure 13.20 U.N. weapons inspectors search a presidential palace in Iraq.

Ritter adds, “But we’re like the proverbial camel. Once you let her nose in under the tent, we’re coming in. You’re not going to stop us. And once the Iraqis started admitting a lie, we were on them.”

UNSCOM’s detective work revealed indisputable evidence of both chemical and biological weapons.

As the U.N. inspectors worked alongside their Iraqi counterparts, the level of cooperation and tolerance varied.

But by 1993, at the chemical weapons decommissioning site of Al-Muthana, the very scientists who had overseen the manufacture of Hussein’s chemical weapons were overseeing their destruction.

Thousands of artillery shells loaded with toxic chemicals, as well as tons of bombs and rockets, went up in smoke.

Perhaps the most accepted measure of UNSCOM’s success is the fact that it destroyed more of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction than were eliminated by the combined forces of Desert Storm.

Despite all the progress being made, however, the weapons inspectors knew they were at work on a giant jigsaw puzzle and that many of the key pieces were still missing.

“We [had] come to an interesting problem. Because the Iraqis didn’t fully cooperate from the beginning, there’s always going to be this level of mistrust,” says Ritter. “UNSCOM’s never going to fully believe what the Iraqis are putting on the table.”

The UNSCOM team became convinced that Iraq was still concealing parts of its arsenal. Iraq strenuously denied the accusations.

When UNSCOM did eventually find its smoking gun, it came from a most unexpected source: the family of President Saddam Hussein.

In August of 1995, Saddam Hussein’s two sons-in-law—together with his daughters—defected. One of them, Hussein Kamel, had been in charge of Iraq’s secret weapons concealment operations. He started to reveal the inner workings of the Iraqi armaments program as soon as he arrived in Jordan.

“We were ordered to hide everything from the beginning. And indeed a lot of information was hidden and many files were destroyed in the nuclear chemical and biological programs,” Kamel told CNN after his defection. “These were not individual acts of concealment, but they were the result of direct orders from the Iraqi head of state.”

Baghdad moved quickly to defuse the situation. They turned over a hoard of documents, claiming that Kamel had stashed them away on a chicken farm, without the authority of the leadership. The boxes contained a treasure trove of information on every aspect of Iraq’s weapons programs.

“It is generally believed that the Iraqi government feared that he would reveal a number of things from Jordan and that they decided that they would preempt this, that they would discover the files in the chicken farm and place the blame on him,” explains Dr. Hans Blix, executive chairman of the U.N. Monitoring and Verification Commission.

UNSCOM now had a detailed roadmap of Iraq’s biological and chemical weapons concealment program.

After the disclosures, Kamel hoped he would find a new life outside Iraq. But Kamel’s hope turned to despair. After weeks languishing in Jordan as guests of the late King Hussein, the two brothers allowed themselves to be lured back home with

promises of mercy. It was a fatal mistake. They died in a shootout in Baghdad. The incident was later described in Iraq as a family matter.

Intent vs. Effect

Bombings and Sanctions Create Humanitarian Crisis in Iraq.

For the first 33 days of Desert Storm, the war was waged from the air. The brunt of the allied attacks was focused on Iraq's army in Kuwait. One goal of the air campaign was to degrade those forces through a conventional bombing campaign. But the air war had another, equally important goal: the destruction of Saddam Hussein's command and control apparatus. That objective took the battle to Iraq's capital, Baghdad.

Black and white pictures from the alliance underscored the accuracy of so-called "smart bombs," designed to surgically strike pre-selected targets. But smart bombs made up less than 5 percent of all the ordnance used against Iraq during Desert Storm. The dramatic images did not show the impact these bombs had on Iraq's troops or civilians.

Twenty-eight days into the war, it became apparent that even the smartest technology could not prevent civilian casualties. Laser-guided weapons struck a presumed military target that turned out to serve also as a bomb shelter.

Iraq's infrastructure—bridges, roads, water and electrical power systems—was severely damaged. Many Iraqis lost services vital to daily life. By the war's end, one of the most prosperous and modern Arab countries in the Middle East lay in economic ruins (Figure 13.21).



Figure 13.21 Burning oil fields were one of the worst forms of environmental destruction left after Iraq deliberately set oil wells ablaze as it withdrew from Kuwait.

If Iraqis had expected life to improve, they were mistaken. Indeed, 10 years on, the Iraqi economy is barely functioning. The United Nations manages Iraq's oil revenues and strict sanctions remain on what can and cannot be imported.

These trade restrictions have contributed to a spiraling humanitarian crisis for the country at large. A recent UNICEF study, drawing on World Health Organization support and Iraqi data, found that a half million Iraqi children under 5 have died because of the living situation in Iraq. Under pre-war living conditions, they would have survived, the study found.

Few Western observers dispute that the regime's defiant posture towards the U.N. has added to the suffering of its own people. Nevertheless, the sanctions have inspired a bitter blame game.

"It's very easy to get emotional about sanctions," warns Sir Jeremy Greenstock, British ambassador to the United Nations. "The fact is that the Iraqi government never considered the options in front of them with the Iraqi people in mind."

But the former U.N. humanitarian coordinator for Iraq, Denis Halliday, believes the sanctions are to blame. "The task at hand is to disarm Iraq," he says, "not to kill children and the people of the country, which is exactly what this program is doing."

Halliday is a former assistant secretary-general of the United Nations. In 1997 he was appointed the humanitarian coordinator in Iraq. In 1998, he resigned in protest.

"You've got ten years of sanctions . . . where there is massive malnutrition amongst children in particular, including chronic malnutrition, which leaves permanent damage, mental and physical damage, to this sort of 'sanctions generation' that we in the United Nations have created," Halliday complains.

"We cannot have the United Nations, the guardian of well-being, sustaining a regime of embargo or sanctions on a people that impacts only on the people, not on the decision-makers . . . not on the government. And more than impacts, it kills the people," he continues. "We are, in my view, guilty through the Security Council of committing genocide in Iraq."

The U.N. denies such charges, as does [*sic*] Great Britain and the United States.

Greenstock refutes the charges, saying, "I don't think it helps to talk in these terms; they don't mean anything."

"Clearly the international community would like the Iraqi economy and the Iraqi people to be restored to their normal operations, the normal talents of the Iraqi people. There's no argument with them; the argument's only with the regime," he says.


U.S. Assistant Secretary of State David Welch agrees with Greenstock.

"I think the international community is in the lead in trying to ameliorate effects of sanctions and the regime in Baghdad is in the lead in trying to aggravate them on its own people," Welch says, adding that Baghdad "presents this case to the Iraqi people, who are well-intentioned but frankly a little soft-minded, and say that it's our fault. I think that is explicitly not true."

Iraq views the actions of the alliance rather differently.

"Their real agenda is not to implement Security Council resolutions on Iraq of weapons of mass destruction. Their real agenda is to topple Iraqi government, to dismantle Iraq and to destroy this country," says Saeed Hassan, Iraq's ambassador to the U.N.

Halliday has also leveled another charge. According to international health experts, epidemics of cholera, dysentery and hepatitis have plagued Iraq. These dis-



eases come from water-borne contamination. Halliday blames this contamination on the targeting of Iraq's infrastructure during the Gulf War.

He points to a recently declassified U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency document that was issued at the start of the conflict, laying out Iraq's vulnerable water situation. The document also acknowledges that a shortage of pure drinking water could "lead to increased incidences, if not epidemics, of disease."

"I think there's no doubt whatsoever that the Americans had worked out the vulnerability of Iraq in terms of clean fresh water," Halliday says. "So they set about destroying electrical power capacity, which is essential, of course, for the treatment and distribution of water."

Welch again refutes this charge. "I can't imagine that people will believe that we honestly do that. We did target Iraqi infrastructure during Desert Storm. We did it for a military reason—to reduce the risk to us [and] . . . to accomplish our objective of liberating Kuwait."

For a decade, Iraqi civilians have suffered under sanctions. The U.N. has tried to address the problem with an "oil-for-food" program that was set up to allow Iraq to sell oil on the international market in exchange for food and medicine. When this program was first proposed, Hussein claimed it was a gross intrusion on Iraqi sovereignty. After five years, he finally agreed to the program.

"I think what the oil-for-food program did, once medicine and food started to flow, which didn't happen until the end of 1996, is that it has reduced some of the acute suffering that was leading to the death of the under five-year-olds," says Andrew Mack, director of strategic planning in the office of the U.N. secretary-general. "But the real problem, I think, is that the humanitarian impact of these sanctions is a much more subtle one. It is the continual erosion of educational systems, of health systems, the inability of the Iraqi economy to revive, and as a consequence one can really begin now to talk about a lost generation."

"If sanctions end tomorrow, you cannot bring back these ten years that have been lost by the young people," says Hans Von Sponeck. In 1998, Von Sponeck became the new head of the U.N.'s humanitarian program in Iraq. Eighteen months later, he, like his predecessor Denis Halliday, resigned in protest over sanctions.

"We can expect people entering adult life much less well prepared than their parents were in facing civic responsibility, in having an ethical and moral grounding—when they were taught mainly how to survive under sanctions," Von Sponeck says. "The chances are pretty good that we will see a generation that will not be so favorably inclined towards countries in Europe and North America."

Halliday agrees. "These people are no longer focusing on, perhaps, forms of government or changing the system. They're focusing on survival. . . . We've demolished that very class, the very people, the very professionals amongst the Iraqi population who were thinking about better systems of government."

But according to the U.S. State Department, the continuing humanitarian crisis in Iraq ultimately should be blamed on Hussein.

"The responsibility is fundamentally the Iraqi government's to take care of its own people," says Welch. "With all the resources going into the oil-for-food program today, if the Iraqi government wants to do something, it can do it. It can build a school, it can supply water, it can address the needs of infants . . . and it can also choose not to do it. And all too frequently, it chooses not to do it."

"Lifting the sanctions will not automatically help the Iraqi people because there is something which stands in between, and that is Saddam Hussein," he says.



In fact, there are other obstacles. Iraq's imports are closely monitored by the United Nations for so-called dual-use materials—goods that have both military and civilian applications. Supplies of a wide range of items, from galvanized water pipes to chlorine bleach have all been tightly restricted by so-called “holds” on contracts.

“We have so many holds imposed on our needs by the American and the British representative within the sanctions committee. There are a lot of delays, a lot of obstacles,” says Iraqi oil minister Gen. Amer Rashid. “So we are not really in control of our funds to use them for the interests of our people.”

In the end, it is oil that continually refocuses the world's attention on Iraq. And fears that Hussein might once more play politics with oil have returned.

Both the allied strategic bombing campaign and the sanctions were used by Hussein to unite his people against the West—to portray Iraq as a David forced to do battle with Goliath. So, despite all its economic woes and isolation, Saddam Hussein's rule over his country appears to be as secure as ever.

Uprisings and Coups

Hussein Maintains Control in Iraq.

After weeks of suffering the brunt of the coalition air attacks on his country, Saddam Hussein was issued an ultimatum: Withdraw from Kuwait or risk a ground war. Nearly 630,000 allied troops were in the region and on full battle alert. Soldiers from all over the world were ready and waiting to fight.

As the clock ticked, U.S. President George Bush gave one of the most controversial speeches of the war, calling on Iraqis to rise up against their leader.

“There is another way for the bloodshed to stop: And that is, for the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside and then comply with the United Nations' resolutions and rejoin the family of peace-loving nations,” Bush said on February 15, 1991.

As the air war continued, Bush's call for the Iraqi people to turn on their leader went unanswered. So did the ultimatum given to Hussein. The ground war lasted for 100 hours. It was an unambiguous victory for the alliance. Hussein claimed his troops had been withdrawn from Kuwait; but, in truth, it was a rout.

As his defeated forces limped home, Saddam Hussein had to face opposition from within Iraq. The traditionally rebellious Kurdish tribes in the north, as well as much of the Shi'ite Muslim community in the south of the country, took up arms against the regime.

“The revolt took place with the encouragement of the president of the United States. The words of the president were followed by leaflets and broadcasts. People believed it. And when they rose up, they expected to get help and assistance from allied forces in the region,” says Dr. Ahmed Chalabi of the Iraqi National Congress.

But the rebels found themselves fighting alone.

As part of the cease-fire agreement negotiated by Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, the United States military agreed to let Iraq fly its own helicopters. Iraq claimed they were needed to transport their leaders; instead, they were used as gun ships against the rebels.

“I suggested to Secretary Cheney and to Gen. Powell that we rescind Gen. Schwarzkopf's permission. They said it would be a serious thing to do. It would undermine his command over his forces and so on—so I didn't pursue it,” explains then-National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft. “It was a mistake. . . . If we had taken it to the president, I would have been very strongly opposed to letting them continue to fly.”

As the revolt spread, the U.S.—worried that a fractured Iraq would create more instability in an unpredictable region—chose not to support the rebellion. With no military assistance, the rebels were overwhelmed and crushed.

In the years that followed, Hussein managed to avoid many challenges to his regime. One of the most intriguing was a 1996 coup attempt, allegedly organized by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), using Iraqi military officers. It didn't succeed, and the CIA won't comment.

"Saddam's security apparatus penetrated the conspirators," says Said K. Aburish, author of *"Saddam Hussein: The Politics of Revenge."* "And last minute, as the coup was about to take place, they used the same mobile telephones supplied to the conspirators by the CIA to call the CIA headquarters in Amman, Jordan, and tell them, 'This is the last you would hear from your friends, because we have them, good-bye.'"

Scowcroft says Hussein is "so ruthless and he has three security organizations—they not only protect him, they watch each other."

Scowcroft, the former aide to President Bush, believes it is unlikely Hussein will ever be overthrown.

"It is virtually impossible for any kind of a plot to get going without him finding out about it and destroying not only the plotters but their families," he says. "So unless there is a portion of the army which revolts almost instantaneously, I think it's very unlikely that he will be toppled."

Keeping the Kurds Safe⁷

After the War, the Allies Began Protecting What Saddam Sought to Destroy.

Before the Gulf War, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein conducted a campaign of suppression in the 1980s against the Kurd people living in northern Iraq, including a March 1988 poison gas attack in Halabja, Iraq, in which an estimated 5,000 Kurds were killed (Figure 13.22).



Figure 13.22 Kurdish victims of an Iraqi poison gas attack lie where they were killed on March 22, 1988, in northern Iraq.

⁷This part of the article can be accessed on CNN.com by choosing the *Kurds* button on the article Web site.

The Gulf War itself proved to be a momentary lull in Hussein's war against Kurds in northern Iraq. The Kurds were emboldened by the allies' victory in the war and used that victory to assert their own case for independence, but they were quickly defeated by the Iraqi armed forces. The offensive resulted in some 1.5 million Kurds scrambling through the mountains, headed for Turkey. The United Nations created what it called a "safe haven" in northern Iraq. Since the end of the Gulf War, U.S. and British military forces have enforced a "no-fly" zone over northern Iraq. This restricted zone was created to prevent Iraqi attacks against the Kurds. A similar zone in the South is meant to protect Shiite [Shia] Muslims (Figure 13.23).

The U.N. also set up a humanitarian relief campaign, called Operation Provide Comfort. It officially began on April 7, 1991, when four U.S. Air Force C-130s took off from an airbase in Turkey to airdrop food and water to Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq.

Although the first phase of the operation ended in July 1991, the second phase began that same month and lasted for five more years. The U.S. armed forces, and other allies, flew more than 60,000 flights into the area, not only dropping off supplies but also patrolling for hostile aircraft.

However, several clashes have occurred as Iraq has protested the viability of the no-fly zones. In 1996, Iraq moved against Kurds in the north under the guise of carrying out routine military exercises and installed pro-Saddam Kurds into positions of power in the Kurdish town of Irbil. On September 3, 1996, the U.S. struck 14 targets in southern Iraq with 27 cruise missiles in response.

In December 1998, Iraq announced it would no longer recognize the no-fly zones, a declaration which came after a four-day U.S. and British bombing campaign, called Operation Desert Fox. That operation came in response to Iraq's continued obstruction of U.N. weapons inspectors, and was followed by several months' worth of scattered airstrikes. Iraq continues, for the most part, observing the no-fly zones, however.

Although their long-term safety may one day be assured through intervention of the U.S. and other allied forces, the Kurds have begun considering a political



Figure 13.23 No-fly zones over Iraq since the First Gulf War in 1991.

future for themselves. Since 1991, the Kurds in northern Iraq have functioned like an autonomous region, only without tacit approval of the Iraqi government. The Kurds have run their own schools, law enforcement, social programs, and militias without Iraqi interference. The U.S. State Department has been involved in recent efforts to unify [sic] the two rival Kurdish factions which operate in northern Iraq, the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. They operate together under a September 1998 agreement brokered by the United States, which, at the time, promised elected government after a transitional period of power-sharing.

In June 1999, Elizabeth Jones, principal deputy assistant secretary for Near Eastern Affairs at the U.S. State Department, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, "Just last week, leading members of the two major Kurdish factions in northern Iraq came to Washington for talks aimed at strengthening the reconciliation process. The two major Kurdish leaders, the Turkomans and other groups from northern Iraq, have played a very positive role in reunifying and reviving the Iraqi National Congress."

The U.S. also aims to involve the united Kurd factions into [sic] an opposition coalition against Hussein. In March 2000, the U.S. Congress approved \$100 million for the Clinton administration to aid the Iraqi opposition.

The Kurds consider themselves the world's largest ethnic group without a homeland, one that has been promised statehood in the past, specifically after World War I, only to have that promise taken away. Turkey is home to more than half of the world's 25 million Kurds, and the rest live in rugged, mountainous areas of Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Armenia and Syria.

In conjunction with CNN Productions, "The Unfinished War: A Decade Since Desert Storm" was produced by Jason Williams and Diana Sperrazza and co-produced by Bill Morgan. It should be noted that Iraqi officials refused the producers of this program access to their country.

► *THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY*

November 2002

Excerpted from: **The Fifty-First State?**

By James Fallows

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Over the past few months I interviewed several dozen people about what could be expected in Iraq after the United States dislodged Saddam Hussein. An assumption behind the question was that sooner or later the United States would go to war—and would go with at best a fraction of the support it enjoyed eleven years ago when fighting Iraq during the Gulf War. Most nations in the region and traditional U.S. allies would be neutral or hostile unless the Bush Administration could present new evidence of imminent danger from Iraq.

A further assumption was that even alone, U.S. forces would win this war. The victory might be slower than in the last war against Iraq, and it would certainly cost more American lives. But in the end U.S. tanks, attack airplanes, precision-guided bombs, special-operations forces, and other assets would crush the Iraqi military. The combat phase of the war would be over when the United States destroyed Saddam Hussein's control over Iraq's government, armed forces, and stockpile of weapons.

What then? . . .

Territorial integrity is where the exercise of power might first be put to a major test.


In ancient times what is now central Iraq was the cradle of civilization, Mesopotamia (“Mespot” in Fleet Street shorthand during the British-mandate era). Under the Ottoman Empire today’s Iraq was not one province but three, and the divisions still affect current politics. The province of Baghdad, in the center of the country, is the stronghold of Iraq’s Sunni Muslim minority. Sunnis dominated administrative positions in the Ottoman days and have controlled the army and the government ever since, even though they make up only about 20 percent of the population. The former province of Mosul, in the mountainous north, is the stronghold of Kurdish tribes, which make up 15 to 20 percent of the population (Figure 13.24). Through the years they have both warred against and sought common cause with other Kurdish tribes across Iraq’s borders in Turkey, Iran, and Syria. Mosul also has some of the country’s richest reserves of oil. The former province of Basra, to the southeast, borders Iran, Kuwait, and the Persian Gulf. Its population is mainly Shiite Muslims, who make up the majority in the country as a whole but have little political power.

The result of this patchwork is a country like Indonesia or Soviet-era Yugoslavia. Geographic, ethnic, and religious forces tend to pull it apart; only an offsetting pull from a strong central government keeps it in one piece. Most people think that under the stress of regime change Iraq would be more like Indonesia after Suharto than like Yugoslavia after Tito—troubled but intact. But the strains will be real.

“In my view it is very unlikely—indeed, inconceivable—that Iraq will break up into three relatively cohesive components,” Phebe Marr, the Iraq expert, told the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. But a weakened center could mean all sorts of problems, she said, even if the country were officially whole. The Kurds could seize the northern oil fields, for example. The Turkish government has long made clear that if Iraq cannot control its Kurdish population, Turkey—concerned about separatist movements in its own Kurdish provinces—will step in to do the



Figure 13.24 Kurdish society has evolved over the centuries, but Kurds still have no state.



job. “Turkey could intervene in the north, as it has done before,” Marr said. “Iran, through its proxies, could follow suit. There could even be a reverse flow of refugees as many Iraqi Shia exiles in Iran return home, possibly in the thousands, destabilizing areas in the south.”

The centrifugal forces acting on postwar Iraq, even if they did not actually break up the country, would present a situation different from those surrounding past U.S. occupations. America’s longest experience as an occupier was in the Philippines, which the United States controlled formally or informally for most of a century. Many ethnic, linguistic, and religious differences separated the people of the Philippine archipelago, but because the islands have no land frontier with another country, domestic tensions could be managed with few international complications. And in dealing with Japan and Germany after World War II, the United States wanted, if anything, to dilute each country’s sense of distinct national identity. There was also no doubt about the boundaries of those occupied countries.

Postwar Iraq, in contrast, would have less-than-certain boundaries, internal tensions with international implications, and highly nervous neighbors. Six countries share borders with Iraq. Clockwise from the Persian Gulf, they are Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, and Iran. None of them has wanted Saddam to expand Iraq’s territory. But they would be oddly threatened by a post-Saddam breakup or implosion. The Turks, as noted, have a particular interest in preventing any country’s Kurdish minority from rebelling or forming a separatist state. The monarchies of Saudi Arabia and Jordan fear that riots and chaos in Iraq could provoke similar upheaval among their own peoples.


“In states like the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, even Saudi Arabia,” says Shibley Telhami, the Anwar Sadat Professor of Peace and Development at the University of Maryland, “there is the fear that the complete demise of Iraq would in the long run play into the hands of Iran, which they see as even more of a threat.” Iran is four times as large as Iraq, and has nearly three times as many people. Although it is Islamic, its population and heritage are Persian, not Arab; to the Arab states, Iran is “them,” not “us.”

As Arab regimes in the region assess the possible outcomes of a war, Telhami says, “they see instability, at a minimum, for a long period of time, and in the worst case the disintegration of the Iraqi state.” These fears matter to the United States, because of oil. Chaos in the Persian Gulf would disrupt world oil markets and therefore the world economy. Significant expansion of Iran’s influence, too, would work against the Western goal of balancing regional power among Saudi Arabia, Iran, and postwar Iraq. So as the dust of war cleared, keeping Iraq together would suddenly be America’s problem. If the Kurds rebelled in the north, if the Shiite government in Iran tried to “reclaim” the southern districts of Iraq in which fellow Shiites live, the occupation powers would have to respond—even by sending in U.S. troops for follow-up battles. . .

► AUTHORS’ EPILOGUE

May 9, 2003

On March 19, 2003, after a long, controversial, and only partially successful diplomatic effort, the United States and a coalition of international allies went to war against Iraq. The main goals of the war, dubbed Operation Iraqi Freedom by the U.S. Department of Defense, were to remove Saddam Hussein and his family from power and to locate and destroy Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. On April 9,




with Coalition forces entering Baghdad, residents took to the streets and, with the help of U.S. Marines, toppled statues of Saddam Hussein. By April 11, as the Iraqi army melted away into the civilian populace and looting of government buildings and museums raged, it became clear that Saddam Hussein was no longer in power. By May 1, President Bush announced that “major combat operations in Iraq have ended.”

What most marked this war was the collapse of international unity and the shaking of the United Nations as the basis for international action. As CNN.com’s “Unfinished War” program explained, there had been tremendous unity in 1991 on the fact that Iraq had illegally invaded Kuwait and that the international community needed to take action to liberate Kuwait. Following the Gulf War, there was fairly widespread agreement on the need for weapons inspections because of the threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. After the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, however, the Bush administration concluded that the weapons inspection program was not achieving its desired effect and that U.S. homeland security was threatened by Iraq’s continued possession of weapons of mass destruction. On October 11, 2002, the U.S. Congress approved the use of force if Iraq did not disarm.

On February 5, 2003, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell delivered a speech to the U.N. Security Council outlining evidence that Iraq has been purposely concealing its ongoing programs for developing biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons from U.N. weapons inspectors. Powell outlined the threat Iraq’s weapons pose to the security of the United States, Israel, Europe, and even Iraq’s own citizens, and argued that the risk of inaction far exceeded the risks of war. He pointed out that Iraq was in violation of U.N. Resolution 1441, which entailed “serious consequences” for noncompliance with UNSCOM, and that everyone knew that “serious consequences” meant the use of force when the resolution was crafted. He also tried to make a case for growing Iraqi involvement with the al-Qaeda terrorist organization.

The United States failed, however, to convince many countries that war was the best course of action at this time. Germany and France led the opposition. They argued that peaceful diplomatic options had not yet been exhausted and that war could further the rift between the Islamic world and the West. Furthermore, they believed that international action over the last decade had effectively contained Iraq’s threat, albeit not eliminated it. Many people in the United States and worldwide were not convinced that Iraq had any substantial contribution to the September 11 attacks. Mass protests broke out at home and abroad. Surprising to many Americans, the international focus began to turn away from the danger of a tyrant with weapons of mass destruction and toward the danger of a world with a single superpower—the United States—that is willing and able to project that power around the world unilaterally (i.e., on its own). Some European allies were appalled at what they saw as lack of respect the United States has for international law and its willingness to attack regimes in sovereign states that it sees as “evil” and threatening to its national security without multilateral backing by the United Nations. France, Russia, and China—all permanent members of the U.N. Security Council—threatened to veto any U.N. resolution authorizing an invasion of Iraq. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan warned that without a new resolution endorsing it, war on Iraq “will not be in conformity with the (U.N.) Charter,” a cornerstone of international law.

Rather than risk a defeat in a new U.N. vote authorizing the use of force, the United States and its coalition partners chose to launch an invasion on their own, stating that the use of force was not only justified but required by previous U.N.




resolutions. The Bush administration argued that the U.S./Coalition forces were simply putting the previous resolution 1441 into effect and that international law would actually be undermined by failing to enforce resolutions. Moreover, President Bush argued that the United States “has the sovereign authority to use force in assuring its own national security,” and that “terrorists and terror states do not reveal these threats with fair notice, in formal declarations; and responding to such enemies only after they have struck first is not self-defense, it is suicide.” Among the more prominent supporters of the U.S. position were the United Kingdom, Australia, Spain, Islamic countries of Qatar and Kuwait, and former Soviet-bloc countries of Bulgaria and Poland. Several Arab and Islamic countries in the Persian Gulf called on Saddam Hussein to step down voluntarily to save the region from war. Turkey, however, refused to let U.S./Coalition forces launch a ground assault on Northern Iraq from Turkey and reasserted its right to send troops into Iraq to stem Kurdish refugee flows and suppress any movement toward an independent Kurdish state. The coalition countries finally gave Saddam a 48-hour ultimatum to step down. When that did not occur, the war was launched.

As of our publication deadline on May 9, 2003, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Spain were proposing a U.N. resolution that would authorize the United States and the United Kingdom to run Iraq for one year as legally approved occupying powers. The resolution also called for the lifting of economic sanctions against Iraq, which would allow oil sales to generate funds for humanitarian and reconstruction needs. Under the proposed plan, the United States and the United Kingdom would work to restore stability to Iraq and create “conditions in which the Iraqi people may freely determine their own political future.”⁸

When you read this, you will already know the answers to questions that we can only ask at this time. How many casualties have there been among Iraqi forces and Iraqi civilians? How and when was Saddam Hussein eventually captured or killed, or did he escape, surrender, or go into exile, and was he prosecuted for war crimes? Were weapons of mass destruction found, used against U.S./Coalition forces, launched at Israel, or smuggled out to terrorists? Were more terrorist attacks launched against the West, and if so where and by whom? Over time, were U.S./Coalition forces treated as liberators or imperialists by the Iraqi populace, and did the response vary by ethnic group? How was the new government structured, and did the Kurds and/or Shias achieve regional autonomy or independence? Has the war galvanized the Islamic world against the United States, as many protesters feared, or has it radically transformed the Middle East, with dictators falling and democracy taking root in Iraq and elsewhere, as many in the Bush administration hoped? Was James Fallows correct in predicting that Iraq would become a virtual 51st state?

As you now know, the concepts of nations and states as applied to the Iraqi Kurds, Sunni, and Shia provide only some of the pieces of the puzzle of the current crisis. Iraqi and Islamic fundamentalist enmity toward the United States and the West is due partly to cultural and economic globalization, partly to oil and geopolitics, and partly to nation/state politics in Israel (see also Chapters 2 and 8). Nevertheless, as you look forward and backward in time, and as you look more closely within and outside Iraq’s borders, the fundamental nation and state geography underlies and complicates matters. The fact that Palestinians, Iraqis, Saudis, and Kuwaitis share

⁸CNN.com. 2003. U.S., Britain Seek To Run Iraq For At Least a Year (May 9, 2003): www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/05/09/sprj.iqrq.main/index.html.



the same religion and language brings the problems of any one of them that much closer to the others. The fact that colonial Britain imposed Iraq's borders without regard to national homelands contributed to wars with Iran and Kuwait in the 1980s and 1990s. The fact that Iran and Iraq were covertly supporting the revolutionary ambitions of the *other country's* Kurdish populations contributed to the Iran-Iraq war. The fact that Iraq contains three major nationalities will make keeping the peace after the downfall of Saddam Hussein a nightmare (see the Yugoslavia case study in Activity 1 for an example of the eruption of ethnonationalism and irredentism after the loss of a strongman as head of state who was keeping the lid on ethnic tensions). Finally, the fact that Iraq's out-of-power Kurds and Shia overlap into neighboring states further complicates the postwar strategy for maintaining the peace and bringing democracy, freedom, prosperity, and stability to the region.

► DEFINITIONS OF KEY TERMS

Colony An area conquered and administered by a foreign power.

Diaspora Scattered settlements of a particular national group living abroad.

Ethnonationalism A strong feeling of belonging to a nation that is a minority within a state, has its own distinctive homeland within the state's territory, and has deeply rooted feelings that are different from the rest of the state's population.

Homeland Perceived ancestral territory of a nation.

Irredentism A movement to reunite a nation's homeland when part of it is contained within another state. The piece of homeland that is ruled by the other state is known as an *irredenta*.

Nation The largest human grouping characterized by a common origin or ancestry. A territorially based community of people who usually have similar language or religion, a common history (real or imagined), and accepted social ways of behavior that give it a common culture.

Nationalism Loyalty to the nation to which you belong. Often misused today to refer to *patriotism*.

Nation-State A state that has the same boundaries as a nation.

Patriotism Loyalty to the governing state in which you live.

Province A first-level administrative subregion of a state.

Refugee A person who is outside his or her country due to a well-founded fear of persecution and who is unable or unwilling to return.

Regional Autonomy Limited self-rule for a region within the larger state.

Secession Complete break-off of a region into an autonomous, independent state. This occurs when a separatist movement achieves its goals.


Separatism The desire to break a region away from its state and form a new independent state.

Shatterbelt A region caught between powerful forces whose boundaries are continually redefined.

State A political territory equivalent to a "country." Necessary components to qualify as a full-fledged state include (a) defined boundaries, (b) an effective government, (c) international recognition of its formal independence, (d) full sovereignty, (e) organized economy and circulation system, and (f) permanent resident population.

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► ITEMS TO HAND IN

- Activity 1: • Questions 1.1–1.33
- Activity 2: • Questions 2.1–2.35

